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## A NEW RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION.

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During the course of last summer, the announcement was made from a high academic eminence that the world is witnessing the birth of a new religion which is destined to bring within its fold all humane and intelligent persons the world over. That a new religion should shoot up, any day, in Massachusetts, the prolific mother of cults and culture, would not be thought in itself a more remarkable phenomenon than that an exemplary hen had, on any particular morning, during the busy season, laid another egg.

But the national reputation of the precursor, the fact that the utterance contained a substratum of serious truth, however distorted in the presentation, the bland eloquence with which the beauties of the New Jerusalem were described, and, perhaps, the newspaper man's keen appreciation of the commercial value of the sensational, caused the glad tidings announced from the pulpit of the Harvard Theological Summer School to attract widespread attention. The topic threw into the background the five-foot library; it elicited opinion from everybody that was anybody; it held the centre of the stage till interest in religious discovery was eclipsed by the wild enthusiasms that, in the fall, broke out over the latest phase in Arctic exploration.

With all the assurance, if not with all the zeal, of a Hebrew prophet, our seer described the origin and characteristics of the new religion which, he declared, is destined to a universal empire over all serious, educated and well-meaning persons. The

nineteenth century, so runs the preamble, with its advance in all branches of science, with the deeper insight it had given us of nature and the God of nature, as well as of our own heart, has rendered obsolete all traditional views of religious truth. At the same time that century witnessed a change of attitude on the part of the Churches to human society as a whole; and a greater approach than was ever witnessed before, was made towards the embodiment in the actual practices of mankind of the doctrines of the great religious teachers of the race. Hence the present religion of a multitude of humane persons in the twentieth century may, without exaggeration, be called a new religion.—“Not,” our instructor observes, “that any one of its doctrines and practices is really new; but only that the wider acceptance and better actual application of truths familiar in the past at many times and places, but never taken to heart by the multitude or put in force on a large scale, are new.”

Though the ecumenical note is sounded in this Apocalypse, it would seem, from internal evidence, that the prophet's horizon is limited to our own country, and the universality which he promises to the new dispensation is not absolute but relative. It has been said that prophecy is the most gratuitous form of blunder. It might, perhaps, be added that an equally gratuitous form is the attempt to refute a prophecy by argument before the event. So without allowing ourselves to be very much disturbed in mind over this vision of the future and the things that are to be, one may more profitably turn to examine what is the constitution of the new religion which is to supplant, over extensive areas, our traditional Christianity. And perhaps such an inspection will throw some light on the credibility of the Harvard Apocalypse.

The religion of the future, we are informed, will, like all other religions, have two constituent elements—a belief and a practical ideal. Here we must pause to note an instance of confusion of thought which, cropping out continually in the entire pronouncement, disarms all merely logical criticism of the structure. We are informed that one of the reasons why educated per-



sons demand a new religion is that growing freedom in thought and speech renders it impossible to unite religiously-minded people on any basis of dogma, creed, observance, or ritual. Yet, a few lines further down on the same page we are told that the new religion will have a creed to serve as the basis of unity for its members. The creed, indeed, is of the shortest, containing but one article: I believe in God, the loving Father of the universe and of men—and on this dogma the fabric is squarely planted. However, the logical consistency of our prophet is not the object of our enquiry. The dogmatic element, as it is described in the constitution, consists of the idea of God which is to underlie and vivify the practical ideal, or program of action. The new conception of God will comprehend the Jewish Jehovah, the Christian Universal Father, and especially, the modern physicists' omnipresent and exhaustless Energy, with the biological conception of a Vital Force. This ideal will be the synthesis of the results of nineteenth century science and speculation, along with the tenderest teachings that have come down to us from the past. In the idea of God around the scientific central datum of one omnipresent eternal Energy will be arranged all the moral qualities, multiplied to infinity, that one can imagine in the noblest and tenderest of human beings. This God, we are told, is to be conceived as absolutely immanent in each person, as indeed, in all things animate and inanimate.

Here we must interrupt the specification to remark that a little more philosophic precision would be desirable at this point. Are we to look upon this immanent God as at the same time so distinct from the world and especially from ourselves that full play is left for the proper independence of human personality, free will and responsibility? Or, on the contrary, does Dr. Eliot mean to adjust the idea of God to the pantheistic or monistic philosophy of which nineteenth century thought has left such a large legacy to the twentieth? The language of the new evangel is scarcely everywhere consistent on this important point. We say important; for pantheism which identifies as one being and one substance man and the Eternal,

permits no basis for religion at all. One passage, if we are to insist upon holding our guide to the deductions inevitable from his assertions, settles the matter peremptorily. We read the following statement: 'If God is thoroughly immanent in the world, there can be no 'secondary causes' in either the material or the spiritual universe.' Here is pantheism, clear, sweeping and uncomprising enough to satisfy Spinoza or Haeckel. There are no causes but the great, first universal Cause. Man, then, is but an automaton through which flows that primal energy to produce every action, good or bad, that goes to make up the Punch and Judy show which we call life.

We must not, however, press our worthy Mentor too hard upon philosophic grounds; for he has granted himself the privilege of the eclectic method; and notwithstanding this tumble into monism, the idea which he propounds of God, is, apparently, intended to be theistic. The new religion, he declares, will cherish the idea of God as of a loving Father; it will find in the moral history of mankind convincing evidence that God rules the universe with love and directs events to the welfare of men.

One more note completes the conception of God, and of our relation to Him as embodied in the solitary dogma of the new religion. What is the characteristic and the most significant element in the new religious conception of God and of our relations to Him? It is that it will forbid its votaries to trouble themselves with any thoughts concerning God's justice. "It will," we quote textually, "magnify and laud God's compassion, and will not venture to state what the justice of God may or may not require of any of His finite creatures." Our expositor makes a profoundly true remark when he adds that "this will be one of the great differences between the future religion and the past." This unique characteristic, he evidently feels, requires some apology. The reason which he offers is not one to impress anybody as an exhibition of keen dialectics. Our experience of human justice, he argues, shows it to be so imperfect that we cannot base on it any conception of what God's justice is and so we must not think of God's



justice at all. If this argument had any force, it would forbid us equally to attribute to God any moral qualities or attributes whatever, for in man all his moral qualities alike labor under the limitations of finiteness and imperfection. Evidently this reason is but an excuse devised to offer some logical justification for this striking element, the explanation of whose presence in the new religion is to be sought elsewhere, as we shall see.

On observing that divine justice is to be absolutely ignored by the religion of the future, we may expect to find, and we do find, that, in consequence, this religion knows nothing of such a thing as sin, and slurs over, in a surprisingly bold fashion, the question of moral evil; while, of course, retribution and expiation are words unknown to its vocabulary. When we add that it will have no cult or form of worship, and will see in prayer but the practical expression of a foolish belief that the Almighty will interfere with the unchangeable order which He has established in the Cosmos, we have noted all the content of the creed and of what refers to God in the religion of the future.

Let us now see what the new religion calls on us to do. What is the practical ideal which it sets up as the goal of our endeavor. Here everything is as plain, clear and concise as any one could desire. The entire practical teaching is comprehensively formulated in a single commandment: "Be serviceable to your fellow man," or, to vary the formula without changing the meaning: "Promote the general well-being." No exhaustive analysis of this idea of well-being is offered to us; but indications of what it covers are sufficiently abundant. It comprehends everything that tends to diminish the physical evils and to increase the physical comforts and conveniences of life,—the extirpation of disease, improved hygienic methods, proper street sweeping, efficient sewage systems, better schools, public baths, improved playgrounds; in short, the promotion of social betterment so that all may share more universally and on a more liberal scale in the good things of this world. This is the whole duty of man as laid down in the new revelation.

Our prophet, indeed, iterates with penetrating unction that, above all, the purpose of this religion will be to inculcate and foster benevolence, to increase the stock of good-will among men. To all accustomed to attach to well-worn words and phrases the meaning which traditional use has attached to them, this promise to promote good-will has a spiritual flavor, and seems to raise the aim of the new religion above the mere material or physical. But when we ask what is the goal of this good-will, what good is it to pursue and in virtue of such pursuit deserve to be itself called good, the answer is, again, social service. So even when calling on its followers to cultivate good-will, the new religion is thinking of nothing more than increased efficiency in the production of what is comprehensively understood as the blessings of civilization.

Hitherto religion, whatever form it took, concerned itself primarily with something beyond the interests of this world, and addressed itself to the cure of evils, the solace of grief, and the satisfaction of aspirations which are utterly beyond the competence of the sanitary inspector or the surgeon and physician. Very reasonably, Dr. Eliot exhibits some uneasiness that perhaps the new religion may be criticized as somewhat disappointing in this respect. So he asks and essays to answer the question: What consolation for human ills will the new religion offer? He answers, "The consolation which comes to the sufferer from the knowledge that he is more serviceable to others after than he was before the affliction; and of being wiser and tenderer than before; the consolation of memory that preserves the sweet fragrance of characters and lives no longer in presence, recalls the joys and achievements of those lives which are still within mortal view. Obviously, even to its propounder, this measure of consolation is very inadequate to meet and staunch the flow of human tears, and to cheer the hearts that suffer under the countless miseries that make up the tragedy of life. So, recognizing this inefficiency, Dr. Eliot drops the embarrassing subject, and hastens to tell us that the new religion "will not deal chiefly with sorrow and death, but with joy and life. It will not care so much to account for



the evil and the ugly in the world as to interpret the good and the beautiful." *Blessed are the mourners* is a promise not to be found in the beatitudes of the religion of the future. In other words, it confesses itself incompetent to fill an office which humanity has ever regarded as an essential, if not the essential function of religion.

The claim is made for the new religion that it is simple. It is simple. It has secured simplicity by eliminating all the deeper factors of the religious problem, including the central ones of the future life, and man's ultimate destiny. Every religion professes to furnish a key to the Great Enigma, to explain why we are here, whither we are going, and what awaits us beyond the Veil. Religion does not confine its ministrations to multiplying a series of contrivances calculated to mitigate the discomforts of life's voyage; it undertakes to instruct us whither that voyage tends and what awaits us within that bourne from which no traveler returns.

Man does not live by bread alone, his being craves, and he is conscious that his life means more, than the daily repeated routine of satisfying his daily wants. No fulness of purse, no perfection of health even if prolonged indefinitely beyond the normal mark of three score and ten can be accepted by him as the *summum bonum* of human existence. To religion he looks, and from religion he receives another solution of the meaning of life and a promise of other goods, which shall satisfy those demands of his higher nature which, felt by all, have been summed up by the Christian in the cry: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, Oh Lord, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee." On its practical side, the new religion is but Epicureanism expressed in terms of the twentieth century and leavened with the maxim of human brotherhood borrowed from elsewhere. Nobody conscious of the religious sentiment will ever really believe that religion's proper function is to promote the discoveries of science, the progress of hygiene, and better methods of street cleaning; nor will the reluctant be converted by pointing out to him that his purpose in life is not precisely to obtain these felicities for himself but for his fellows. If

science and invention allied with sympathy and benevolence should succeed in bringing about an altruistic Utopia where the humanitarian ideal should be realized, where all should

“ . . . sit at endless feast  
Enjoying each the other's good.”

those needs and aspirations of the soul to which religion responds would call out as poignantly as ever. Life would still continue to be a journey though the wilderness, and the serious soul would still refuse to acquiesce in the ephemeral as the be-all and the end-all here.

Our inspection of this new religion, thus far, shows it to be very unlike any religion that has hitherto been known to men. Every other religion has had some form of worship to the Being in whom it believed; to that Being it addressed prayer of petition and deprecation. Every other religion claimed to tell men of a world beyond, and to inform him of the destiny that awaited him. It had promises for those who faithfully followed it, and anathemas for the disloyal. In the new religion, no prayer, no worship, no penalties, no rewards! No solace for the grief that passeth outward show. Its outlook is bounded by the physical horizon. It is voluble over the things of this world. The rest is silence.

The differences which we have now pointed out between what its sponsor has called the new religion and every other manifestation of the religious instinct that history has witnessed afford by themselves, very good grounds for questioning whether this scheme deserves the title of a religion at all. There remains, still, one consideration which will definitely settle the issue.

However great the changes which the progress of the nineteenth century has wrought in our intellectual outlook, it has not operated any revolution in human nature and the instincts of the heart. Even the wildest of its panegyrists have hesitated to follow Molière's physician in asserting “*Nous avons changé tout cela.*” Well, the very taproot of the religious instinct is that consciousness which man feels of a duality in his



own nature; or that struggle within him, between his higher and lower self, which St. Paul gave expression to when he said, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death," and the Roman poet witnesses to in the line:—

" . . . . Video meliora proboque,  
Pejora sequor . . . ."

The explanation of this dualism has been the ambition and the despair of philosophy. The history of man's endeavors to overcome it is the religious history of the race.

Along with the consciousness of a double nature within himself, man sees a perpetual struggle in the world without. He is bewildered at the spectacle of nature at war with herself; he is bewildered still more and depressed to experience that nature is at war with him, filling his garden and field with thorns and thistles and dogging his steps incessantly with a thousand emissaries of death. The futility of life, hope disappointed, desire unsatisfied, and never less satisfied than when attainment crowns endeavor, wring from him the perennial cry of "*Vanitas Vanitatum*." Yet the instincts of his reason convince him that there must be some rational explanation of this welter of disorder within and without him. He is driven to look behind and above nature for a higher power from whom he can hope for deliverance. At the same time he feels that the duality within him, the evil which lies in his own heart is a barrier between himself and that Being to whom he would surrender himself in loving trust. Then from these two experiences is born *the sense of sin*, and with it the impulse to expiation and atonement.

The forms in which this impulse, emotional and rational, have taken are innumerable and widely diverse in their external characteristics. Yet they all resemble one another in their essential features. The Indian sage seeking to extirpate self by starving all his appetites and repressing all his sympathies; the Buddhist pursuing the Three-fold Path in order to reach Nirvana; the Hindoo throwing himself before the Car of Jugernaut, or consigning his dying relative to the sacred waters of

the Ganges; the ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead; the bloody sacrifices of the Chaldaic, the Aztec, and some more modern forms of savage worship,—all these are witnesses to man's consciousness of sin and his impulse to find some way of expiation. "I have heard your voice in the garden, and I was afraid," is the universal cry of humanity conscious of the evil in its constitution.

Now, it is this sense of sin which is the parent of real religion. We might cite a cloud of witnesses to this truth from every school of thought, Christian and infidel. In fact, the latter offer indirectly the most satisfactory testimony. For their favorite theme is that because the old doctrine of evil as radical in human nature, has become obsolete, the era of religion is past. Whenever this sense of sin has found vigorous expression in a religion, that religion has gripped the heart and become a dominant force in the lives of its votaries. When this sense of sin grows weak in an individual or in a sect, then for these people their religion, however vital and powerful it may once have been, becomes but an affair of empty forms and externalities, maintaining a precarious and ineffective existence only through the conservative tendencies of society unwilling to obliterate too abruptly the associations of the past.

It is this consciousness of sin, this conviction of the heart that moral evil is within ourselves, which makes the distinction between a real religion and a mere philosophic system. Where it is absent, there cannot be any religion but at most a self-complacent sentimental religiosity, such as is present in the deism of the eighteenth century and in "the religion of the future." A religion which will not trouble its followers with self-searchings; which, by excluding from its range of vision the justice of the Almighty, would debar them from ever exclaiming from the depths "My iniquities have divided between me and my God!" is not religion if religion is something to meet the deepest needs of the heart. Such an imitation finds its appropriate attitude not in that type of real religion, the kneeling publican, exclaiming from afar: "Lord, be merciful to me a sinner!" Its proper representative is the self-satisfied



gentleman of the broad phylacteries, whose ambitions are directed to prizes that may be enjoyed this side of the grave; and who stands up before the Almighty to remind Him what a paragon of perfection He had the honor to create. The new religion, with its formal elimination of the idea of Divine justice, and consequently of sin, expiation and atonement, leaves out of its composition the essentials of religion; and for that reason I think one may consequently venture to call it a "New Religion, without Religion."

The only feature of Dr. Eliot's scheme which seems to tinge it with the blush of spiritual life is that a belief in God, as a Beneficent Providence and loving Father of men, is its theoretical foundation. The confession of this truth is, we are told, to be the rock which will furnish the bond of unity for the Church of the future, composed of all those earnest and humane people who will devote their lives to social service.

Well, we should uncommonly like to meet the man who can show us any reasonable grounds for this expectation. If we were to take a census of the people at present leaders in social service, we should find that many, if not the greater number, are professed agnostics, and many others frankly deny the existence of God. Furthermore, many would declare that they had taken up social service as their life's work precisely because they had ceased to find either inspiration or consolation in religious ideals.

We are blandly assured by Dr. Eliot that his own shadowy conception of God, wavering between theism and pantheism, is the mature fruit of nineteenth century science and scientific speculation. Yet everybody knows that an overwhelming majority of the persons who are accepted as the spokesmen of the nineteenth century, laid down as a first principle of reason that to pretend to conceive the Infinite under any of his attributes of personality is to fall into the limbo of absurdity. They follow up this axiom by insisting that an equal absurdity is to pretend that the universe offers us any proof that the First Cause is a benevolent Being. Nature, red in tooth and claw, the conditions of life and the course of history combined to

relegate this notion to the museum in which are preserved the mummies of dead superstitions. The favorite manoeuvre of the nineteenth century thought,—I mean that philosophic thought which, professing to be the daughter of science, attacked religion in her mother's name,—was to point out the prevalence of evil, physical and moral, in the world, and then impale the champion of orthodoxy on this dilemma: The Original Cause of that world cannot be infinitely good and infinitely powerful. If He is all powerful, He is not infinitely good, or He would banish evil. If He is infinitely good, then He does not take away the evil only because it is beyond His power. "If this world," said a standard bearer of nineteenth century thought, "is governed by benevolence it must be a very different sort of benevolence from that of John Howard."

The Christian, indeed, who believes in the Incarnation, and the teachings of Christ, knows that, notwithstanding all the perplexing difficulties that the world presents against the doctrine, God is Love and guides all things benevolently. But this is a belief which the members of the New Religion would never extract from human history or the records of the nineteenth century's conclusions regarding the nature of the Infinite and Eternal Energy. It is a favorite preoccupation of the pious Christian patriot to find in the course of his country's history proof that fidelity to righteousness had been rewarded with the protection and beneficence of the Most High. Kipling's *Recessional* is a classic example of this sort of historical exegesis. But the philosophy of the nineteenth century awarded its suffrages to the rival interpretation:—

"Best by remembering God, some say,  
We hold our high, imperial lot.  
Fortune, I fear, has oftenest come  
When we forgot, when we forgot.  
Their nobler faith, their fairer crown:  
But history laughs and weeps it down."

Even one of the most reverent and religious of men has declared that if he had not his reasons for belief in God elsewhere, he



should be an atheist or a pantheist or a polytheist when he regarded the distressing spectacle of human history. Whatever may be the fortune in store for humanitarianism, we may safely presume that it will not resolve itself into a unity of minds produced by a common belief in a Benevolent Father of the universe and of men.

The accepted name, among friends and foes, for that tendency which Dr. Eliot refers to as the influence or spirit of nineteenth century scientific thought is rationalism. And rationalism though powerful to destroy, is incapable of building any religious foundation. Its inevitable march is towards ever-increasing divisions, contradictions, doubt and agnosticism. It will never produce a unity of minds regarding any of the basic truths of religion, God, freedom and immortality.

The one truth which is embodied in the pronouncement that we have been considering is that, in this country and elsewhere, a large and constantly increasing number of people have adopted humanitarianism as a substitute for religion. Over this movement Dr. Eliot has sought to throw the garb of religion. It is one of the most significant growths of our age. "Nothing but the triumph of the Christian commandment,—an evidence of the power of the Gospel in our day," say many. Undoubtedly Christian truth and zeal have powerfully contributed to strengthen and make active the emotions of human sympathy. But, then, the question suggests itself: How comes it that humanitarianism has waxed strong in proportion as Christian faith and especially belief in the divine authority of Christ, has grown weak? Why is it that while Christ taught that the second commandment "Love thy neighbor as thyself" draws its vigor from the first, "Love God above all things," the prophets of humanitarianism declare that those truths implied in the first commandment are mere delusions that will not stand the search of reason. If we note the attitude of typical humanitarians towards Christ as a teacher, we shall observe that instead of looking to the authority of Christ for the sanction of their code, they grant Him their approbation just as far as He was a good humanitarian.

One who would undertake the task of tracing the genesis and development of this philosophy of life would be compelled to look elsewhere; and his search would bring him into contact with men, ideas and forces, operating independently of, often in hostility to Christianity, and, in fact, to all religious belief. As he traced the stream back to its head waters he would discover that one of its mainsprings, if not the original source itself, was the infidel French philosophy that burst upon the world in the eighteenth century. It may seem to some a lapse into gratuitous calumny to affirm that Diderot, Voltaire, Holbach and D'Alembert are among the ethical progenitors from whom the religion of the Harvard Theological Summer School inherits its features. Yet it is quite true. Let us cite a piece of testimony borne to the legitimacy of the descent, by a competent but inadvertent witness. Any one who has read Dr. Eliot's pronouncement will agree that the postulates which underlie the religion of service and are expected to furnish its motives for action are fairly set forth in the following passage:—

“Human nature is good, the world is capable of being made a desirable abiding place, and the evil of the world is the fruit of bad education and bad institutions.”

The writer of these words, however, had not Dr. Eliot in mind when he wrote them. They are the terms in which Lord Morley, an authority on the subject, described broadly the moral and the message of the French Encyclopaedia. Our enquirer would find himself obliged to analyze the teachings of Jean Jacques Rousseau; and trace the broad current of his influence, reaching into many an unsuspected quarter, from the end of the eighteenth century up to this very day. He would observe that the establishment of the democratic principle in the end of the eighteenth century counted for much in the production of the phenomenon under consideration. The weakening of class distinctions consequent upon the assertion of democracy, the increased facilities for communication and travel bringing men into association on a scale hitherto unknown, have also contributed.



Another powerful and closely related cause has been the direction given to ethical speculation by the success of rationalism in banishing from large tracts of the intellectual world all belief in the supernatural. We must have some end beyond securing and enjoying our *panem et circenses*, to give a meaning and dignity to life. If we reject Religion as a guide, who points to another world, then we must find the end of life within life itself, and within that circle there is but one worth a moment's notice—the betterment of human conditions, the welfare of our fellows.

This view was propagated in a strictly scientific form by the widely dominant school of ethical construction which laid down as the fundamental principle of morality that the difference between right and wrong depends upon whether conduct is beneficial or injurious to others. This theory was severely handled by the scientific critics but it managed to fix “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” firmly in the mind of the age as a convenient rough and ready maxim for the orientation of conduct. The evolution philosophy came next to throw its influence into the propaganda of altruism. It popularized the view that the history of man is a record of continuous progress, physical and moral. The goal of nature is the improvement, not of the individual but of the race, and to this interest the interest of the individual is subordinate. This theory helped to strengthen the tendency to look upon the furtherance of progress as the proper and only reasonable end that a serious humane person could propose to himself to consecrate his life.

This triumph of the idea of progress was assisted by the immense advance made in the past century by science in every field of knowledge, by the wonderful series of inventions and discoveries which brought the forces of nature into coöperation with men, diminished enormously the domain of physical pain and disease, and increased, on a similar scale, the conveniences and comforts of life. The success achieved was taken as proof that here lies man's proper career. From this complexus of forces along with others which we cannot enumerate here, was

begotten the humanitarian ideal. The humanitarian has been happily defined as "a person who has sympathy with mankind in the lump, faith in its future progress and a desire to serve that progress."

The decay of religious truth throughout the Protestant world has opened an immense recruiting ground to humanitarianism. Many of those who join the ranks endeavor to deal gently with their ancient loyalties by persuading themselves that, after all, Christ's authentic teaching is all epitomized in the Golden Rule, so that in humanitarianism is the fine essence of Christianity. Some still cling to their religious faith and out of love for and desire to serve God, devote themselves to social service as the thing which their hand finds to do. For this latter class of persons there can be nothing but respectful commendation; they observe the due subordination of the second to the first commandment. But the everlasting order is violated when the progress of civilization is constituted the ultimate end of human endeavor. Christianity and humanitarianism are poles apart. Christianity is the worship of God; humanitarianism is the worship of man. It extinguishes theology in favor of sociology; and as somebody has said, with a touch of exaggeration, "It reduces religion to an aspect of the tenement-house question."

When the promotion of social temporal welfare is exalted into the supreme end of human endeavor only a little logical consistency is needed to land the thoroughgoing votaries of humanitarianism among people who are strange companions for the champions of human sympathy. If the social welfare is the end of man, then the individual must be looked upon as entirely subordinate to the community, the state, or whatever social organism is taken as the unit. His rights must give way before the imperious demands of the body politic. If he is a detriment to the welfare of the whole, why should he be permitted to continue an existence which is pernicious to the high interest of humanity? And here the humanitarian finds his practical inferences rigorously drawn for him by the prophet of the overman, Friedrich Nietzsche, who has



denounced Christianity for having inflicted incalculable injury on the human race by protecting and sustaining various classes of the inefficient who ought to have been summarily got rid of: "Sympathy," he has said, "thwarts on the whole, in general, the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for extinction; it resists in favor of life's disinherited and condemned ones. It gives to life a gloomy and questionable aspect by its abundance of the ill-conditioned whom it maintains in life." Set the idea of the supremacy of the social welfare over all individual rights and duties and we shall have the state regulating who shall and who shall not marry; whether the newborn child shall be allowed to live or not; and, under the name of the science of eugenics, the policy and maxims of the stud-farm shall be applied to men and women. Even now we are occasionally assailed by a spokesman of these principles in the public press, on the lecture platform, and in the halls of some of our legislatures.

JAMES J. FOX.

## REALITY FROM THE CRITIC'S STANDPOINT.—I.

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The problem of human knowledge, when approached from no preconceived point of view, loses much of the mystery with which speculation usually invests it. Problems that do not exist in fact are often created in theory by the way we go about their statement, or attempt their solution. When the real point at issue is obscured, and a fictitious one made to appear in its stead—created, not by the concrete subject under investigation, but by the investigator's abstract way of conducting the examination, there is every likelihood that the critic of human knowledge will be more faithful to the exigencies of procedure than to the guidance of fact. To check this speculative tendency, and to bring the problem of our perceptual knowledge fairly and squarely before the mind for consideration, an effort was made, in a previous study,<sup>1</sup> to cut the facts of perception clear and distinct from any and all theories concerning their origin, nature, or value. This method of treating the empirical facts with the respect to which they are entitled has its advantages, and these we may briefly enumerate.

### ALOOFNESS OR INTIMACY?

First of all, the representative theory of knowledge was seen to be a false approach to the problem of perception. To approach the facts with this theory in mind is to misread them wholly, and we rejected it accordingly as a false light which we could not in all fairness follow. With this rejection of the representative theory went also the doctrine built upon it, that in perceptual knowledge we deal, not with genuine reality itself, but some sort of a substitute, intermediary, or agent of it. Human knowledge has no such half-way features, the real

<sup>1</sup> *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910. "Reality from the Spectator's Standpoint."

world no such middle ground. The supposed mote in the eye of reality thus turns out to be an unsuspected beam in our own, which, when located where it properly belongs, saves us from mistaking introspection for observation, and leaves us closer to reality than we thought.

The same remarks apply with equal force, in the second place, to the persistent attempt of the post-Kantian tradition to evaporate the 'reality' which we *encounter* into an 'appearance' which we *think*. Idealist and agnostic alike have found, in this "distinction without a difference" between reality and its appearances, a much needed prop and support for their sagging theories. They would prevent all intimacy with the real world, and reduce knowledge to a game of 'hide and seek,' by means of this distinction. But it is fiction, not fact, to which they appeal. 'Seeing' cannot thus easily be turned into mere 'believing,' nor has it ever been proved that the world of things is surrounded by so thick an atmosphere of appearances that the mind is utterly unable to penetrate through it to the reality hidden beneath. It must be confessed that, to prove man's aloofness from reality, or to disestablish the fact of his intimacy with it, much more should be forthcoming in the way of argument than such a vanishing distinction as the one proposed.

After being held so long aloof from reality by the restraining influence of Kant, philosophers are now engaged in over-emphasizing the closeness of our acquaintance with it. The pragmatist admits that an intimate knowledge of 'reality' is possible, provided we accept his theory, that this knowledge depends for its acquisition on the subject's becoming one and identical with the object of its search. We are asked to lay aside our own individuality, and to let ourselves sink, as it were, into that of things, by means of the 'sympathetic imagination,' which enlarges the bounds of sense-experience, and deepens our knowledge of the only real world.<sup>2</sup> But the pragmatist

<sup>2</sup> *The Journal of Philosophy*, etc., vol. VII, no. 2: January 20, 1910, p. 30, "Bradley or Bergson?"—William James.



asks us to pay too big a price for his concessionary 'realism.' The *identity* of subject and object is not a necessary condition for acquiring *real* knowledge; the *union* of the two is sufficient, and it is a very strange way of solving a problem to invite us to suppress our own distinct personality, and to assume, even in imagination, the individuality of lower things. We accordingly rejected, as plainly unfair, in the third place, this excessive demand of the pragmatist to have us exchange natures with the things we wish to know. To draw up such impossible conditions for knowledge, and then to disqualify reason for their non-fulfilment, is not philosophy, but caprice. Rapidity seems to have become with philosophers the virtue it has long since been with the promoters of industry and commerce. Immediate results are demanded of mind as of all things else. The constitutionally slow way the mind has of working out its conceptions and judgments does not suit the present mania for speed. And so, philosophers are turning their backs upon conceptual reason and universal ideas, to seek information of sense, and to revel in the particulars, which direct percepts, untransformed feelings, unreasoned ideas, and unmediated knowledge contain in such abundance.

In fact, pragmatism is, in one respect at least, the doctrine that reality may be intimately known in crude feeling, and completely misunderstood in refined thought.<sup>3</sup> Had the pragmatist contented himself with the statement, that reality is *more* intimately known, in all its concrete completeness, by the senses than by the reason, he would have stated a plain fact of which there can be no doubt. But when he made exclusive what should have been merely an affirmative statement, he committed the fault of turning an affirmation into a denial, an emphasis into an exclusion, and forgot that he was misconceiving the very nature of conceptual knowledge itself, in the false contrast which he drew between the latter and its companion process of perception. The pragmatist deserves credit for calling attention to

<sup>3</sup> "Concepts are an organ of misunderstanding rather than of understanding."  
*Ibid.*, p. 30.

the great world of concrete fact, so long neglected by the advocates of 'pure thought,' and the system-builders of idealism. He deserves none for the equally exclusive philosophy of 'pure experience' which he would substitute for the idealist's world of 'pure intelligence.' Each extreme is worthy of the other.

The additional fact was brought out, in the fourth place, that 'knowing' is not altogether the same thing as 'producing,' or 'copying' an object, but much more in its own right, and in the light of the evidence. This being so, it becomes at once apparent that the facts of perception may be critically studied, without discussing beforehand whether objects are faithfully reproduced, or not, in our ideas. The problem of the truth of our ideas, and all questions concerning either the nature of reality, or the nature of consciousness, belong to a study of the judgment, and are out of place where the first act of the human mind is alone under consideration. When we examine the empirical evidence, without minds made up in advance, reality confronts us, wearing neither mask, nor veil, and betraying none of the hunted look of a creature long in hiding. It is as yet without the adjectives, 'external,' or 'internal.' Which of these two rightfully belongs to it, and expresses its true nature? Perception does not say; the first act of the human mind neither affirms, nor denies, the value of its own testimony, but simply presents it. We are therefore driven back upon ourselves and upon our own judgment for answer. We cease to be spectators, and become referees and critics.

#### THE IDEALIST INTERPRETATION.

After the fact of perception, three theories are advanced to account for the 'object' which appears in consciousness—the idealist, the pragmatist, and the realist, to mention them in the order of treatment. The idealist theory regards the object as a mental rather than physical fact, that is, as an idea, appearance, image, sensation, phenomenon. This interpretation is consistent with the general assumption of idealism, that the physical universe is the divine mind itself, and that

'things,' so-called, are really God's 'thoughts' disguised. Was it not Fichte who said that the world contains God's thinking *petrified*? and Madame de Staël, that "architecture is frozen music"? and Shakespeare, that there are "sermons in stones," and "books in the running brooks"? Even so, though in an essential, and not merely metaphorical sense, does the idealist hold that human knowledge reveals a content or meaning of eternal value, and that the objects which appear in consciousness are to be *classed* as bits or fragments of the divine meaning of the world, not as things which exist apart from us in the "lumpishness" of physical reality.

What becomes of the 'object' in this view. It is made to dissolve into a 'message,' a 'signal,' a 'mental content,' a 'rational value,' or an 'eternal meaning.' But this is not all. The idealist does not rest satisfied when he has thus wrongly identified the 'object' with its 'meaning.' He proceeds at once to draw from this false identification two equally false inferences; first: that objects exist discontinuously, when the plain fact of the matter shows the contrary, namely, that it is the perceptive experiences we have of objects, and not the objects themselves, which discontinuously exist; and second: that objects are things only for the mind perceiving them, and consequently possess no existence of their own independent of the fact of their being perceived and known. The distinction between 'being' and 'knowing' thus vanishes into thin air, and the line, which parts the physical from the mental in fact, is blotted out in theory. 'Ideas' are made to appear as constituent elements of 'things,' and knowledge becomes a part of the texture of reality, interwoven with its very fibre.

In defence of this position, it is usual with idealists to fall back upon the fact that subject knowing and object known are "inseparably related." What if they are? This mutual relationship affords no proof that the world is without a constitution of its own until knowledge bestows one on it. The relation of subject to object is indeed a relation of real dependence. But is the relation of object to subject likewise really dependent? Hardly. This reciprocal dependence is always sup-



posed, but never proved. Idealists invariably assume with Kant that reality has, and can have, no predicates of its own attached to it. The object-side of the relation is thus made to depend for the hiding of its nakedness on the mind's condescension to furnish it with clothes in the guise of predicates and attributes. The wretched poverty of reality and the corresponding richness of thought become at once strikingly apparent. The very furniture of the heavens bear the telltale marks of its mental make on every piece, and reality seems to strut before us, falsely proud, in its borrowed and unacknowledged plumes. But what is all this but a huge and false abstraction, a playing-off of the indefinite notion of 'being' against the definite, of the unrelated against the related? The simple fact, underlying all our human knowledge, that we can know only related things, is perverted to mean, that the relations which make *knowing* possible, also make *being* actual. Need it be said once more that reality, while conceivable in the abstract as bare and indefinite, is always this or that in the concrete, and therefore has attributes and contents of its own, not supplied by the lavish furnishing-house of the human mind, as Kant imagined, for no other reason, it would seem, than that he mistook an abstraction of his own conceiving for the constitution of the universe itself.

#### THE PRAGMATIST INTERPRETATION.

The pragmatic theory regards perceived objects merely as "items of experience." The meaning which they convey is felt, rather than thought, and so the pragmatist strikes out the word 'rational' before 'content,' and writes in the phrase "experienced or experienceable," to express what he thinks of 'objects.' Bergson and James both regard the universe as fundamentally and constitutionally irrational, having no meaning as a whole, but much meaning when cross-sections of it are examined, or it is studied by the piece. According to these philosophers, knowledge has no reference whatever beyond experience, being wholly taken up with itself, and with its own

beneficial reactions. Objects are admitted to be independent in the sole sense that they are free to enter or leave our conscious experience, but this admission is more in the line of a rebuff to idealism than a concession to realism. Kant's world of inaccessible 'things-in-themselves' is held up to ridicule, and rightly, but one cannot help thinking that the impossible view which Kant took of reality has had a great deal to do with the pragmatist's resolve to keep human knowledge completely cut off from all relations to anything and everything but itself. The half-heartedness of the pragmatist's admission is more due to Kant's misconception of reality than perhaps to the thing itself which we call by that name.

But pragmatism misses the point altogether when it tries to find the external references of knowledge in the very first moment of perceptive experience. In the admission of all philosophers, regardless of school affiliations, these references do not emerge until later. Knowledge is not seen to possess the power of reaching the 'outside,' or to refer to something other than itself, until the intuitive reason—which must not be confounded with the discursive, as is so often the case—begins to analyze the complex sense-presentation, and discovers subject and object there in mutual presence. The pragmatist chooses the wrong time and the wrong place therefore to discover the full references of knowledge; and, because of his failure to find them where no one claims they are to be found, he straightway declares them non-existent. Of a piece with this procedure is the statement that there exists no object independent of experience. If the meaning be that no object exists independently of *all* experience (the Divine knowledge, for instance), the proposition may be allowed to pass unchallenged. But if we are given to understand that there is no object existing apart from particular, or even universal *human* experience, it is hard to see what support in sense or in reason such a statement may have with those who make it.

Moreover, the pragmatist is inclined to overlook the fact that our perceptive states of mind do not come to us as purely subjective, wholly unrelated experiences. They come to us rather

with an inherent relation to the independent objects by which they are aroused, and to which we do and must adjust ourselves in turn. It is in virtue of this inherent relation that knowledge is self-transcendent, that it penetrates to the exterior, and is not confined to the exploration of a purely inner world. There is much more to knowledge than the mere act of knowing, and to experience, than the mere act of experiencing, and to reality than the mere fact of becoming known. The very attempt of the pragmatist to reduce the objects which we truly experience to such stuff as consciousness is made of only goes to show that they are made of far other stuff than consciousness, else the proposed reduction would never have been so insistently attempted.

#### THE IDEA OF EXTERNAL REALITY.

The realist theory sees more in the 'object' than the precious bit of reasoned, or experienced meaning which the idealist and the pragmatist announce as the sum total of their respective findings. The revelations of knowledge are not only ideal, useful, and practical, they are also *real*, and it is in this last-named quality that the other three find nourishing soil and sustaining ground. The realist refuses to think that the facts of perception are exhausted of all their significance, when the percipient discovers in them such matters of personal worth and utility, as rules of conduct, or plans of action. We ourselves are related to objects as truly as they are related to us, unless we should prefer the atmosphere of poetry to that of experience, and say with Emerson that "the universe is the externization of the soul."

Early in our mental life, perhaps as early as the unfolding of consciousness, there occurs the judgment of externality, or the affirmation that something exists outside of the perceiving mind. This recognition of an existence distinct from our own imposes itself on plain man and philosopher alike, however much the latter may hide it from himself by the blanketing action of his theories. "The externality of the perceived



object to consciousness," says Thomas Hill Green, "seems to be *taken for granted*, even by those who would be quite ready to tell us that the 'things' which we talk of conceiving are but 'nominal essences.'"<sup>4</sup>

What is the reason of this question-begging procedure, this manifest inability of the critic of human knowledge to avoid *presupposing all the while*, in thought as well as language, the very idea which he is engaged so earnestly in *explaining away*? The reason is mainly one of oversight. Two problems are treated promiscuously together, which should have been disentangled, and discussed separately. For instance, it is not the truth or falsity of the idea we have of external reality, but the fact of our having such an idea at all, true or false, that constitutes the fundamental problem, and has prior claim upon the philosopher's attention. This fact, and the problem which it raises, cannot be passed over in silence, complacently taken for granted, and left unexplained, without begging the central point at issue. It is perhaps this overlooking of one problem, in his anxiety to solve another connected with it, that betrays the critic into his wonted inconsistencies of thought and speech. He criticizes everything but his own presuppositions, he examines everything but the starting-point of his own criticisms. Should not the light be turned on what precedes as well as on what follows, on the foundations no less than on the superstructure?

How, for instance, was the notion of external reality, which the critic promptly rejects as an hallucination, originally acquired? and what right has he to presuppose this notion, until he has accounted for its origin, on his own principles? If, on his own showing, the human mind is capable of exploring nothing but itself, and so conspicuously lacks the constitutional power to reach or penetrate anything else, how did it manage to furnish the critic with that very notion of external reality, which he first declares theoretically impossible of formation, and then freely makes use of, as if it were the most natural

<sup>4</sup> *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 59. Italics ours.

thing in the world, and needed no explanation? The critic has evidently forgotten that the problem lying untouched at the beginning of his procedure is bigger than the one at the other end which he is trying to solve. How did it happen that such a foreign notion as that of 'externality' is found freely mingling with the mind's native-born? The mere presence of this 'stowaway' raises a problem, which the subsequent expulsion of the intruder tends only to increase.

One would like to have explained, first of all, and before proceeding further, how this information about 'outside' existence or reality ever came to be acquired by a mind supposedly taken up altogether with the elaboration of its own 'inside' experience. As a matter of fact, we all have the notion of a reality distinct from ourselves, however we came by it, whether honestly or no. The pressing problem is to account for our having it. What we may condescend to think of it afterwards; whether we shall vouchsafe to range it in the category of notions tried and found true, or among those that fail to stand the test, is quite another matter, certainly not the prime question to be decided. It is on the existence and origin of this notion, not on its worth or worthlessness, that the first stress of inquiry falls. And when we try to account to ourselves for the origin and acquisition of the idea of external reality, we discover that it does, and must come from without, and that it cannot possibly be shown to have originated wholly from within. We thus find ourselves at the very centre of the problem of human knowledge. Realism is entrenched in a defensive position, awaiting attack, prepared to meet any attempt to turn its flank, and ready to assume the aggressive, when the occasion for so doing arises.

The attack is not slow in coming, and it is fast and furious along the whole line when it does come. It is necessary to keep one's wits during the engagement, and to console one's self with the sustaining thought that discretion is the better part of valor even in philosophical warfare. To meet the attack effectively at each point where it is delivered, let us rapidly survey the whole field of conflict, and endeavor to compute the relative

strength of the combatants. A successful issue depends in no small measure on a previous knowledge of the ground.

### THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REALITY.

The centre of the realist position is a fact of experience. Each and every one of us, before we have become indoctrinated with theory, and even after, considers the sensible appearances that arise in perception, as the *manifestation of a present reality*. The very skeptic, who questions the validity of this persuasion, acts on it throughout life, as artlessly as the plainest of those whom he is pleased to call 'plain.' And when a man utterly disdains to apply his favorite theory to conduct, the suspicion is, either that he lacks the courage of his own convictions, or that he cannot make his theory work in double harness. This penalty of inconsistency accompanies even the bare intellectual act of questioning the existence and presence of reality. We doubt or deny only to find that we are at the same time affirming *some* knowledge of the reality which we are bent on proving inaccessible or unknowable. No man comes away from a consultation of his own experience with the thought in mind, that the objects which he finds there are 'pure appearances.' The 'apparition theory' of objects is therefore imposed *on* experience, not *by* it. Human knowledge begins, as was said before, with a simple act of apprehending something, not with a full-blown prejudgment about the nature of the thing apprehended.

The first apprehensive act of the mind reveals the presence of a total mass—a real, distinct, and united whole which we call by the name of 'object.' The pen with which I am writing, for instance, betrays a certain resistance and temperature to the sense of touch; to sight it has a shape and color, while to the ear its crunching passage over the page comes as the sound of whispering. All these phenomena, though registered by different senses, are yet referred by me to one and the same object—the distinct and united existence of which my mind affirms. What is it that thus compels me to unify the im-



pressions received through the several channels of sense? Is it the mind alone, or the mind acting in conjunction with the object?

Kant and Hamilton would have it, that the compelling reason is one of subjective necessity—a sheer tendency on the part of the mind to bind its own scattered impressions together into sheaves, and to tie a mental knot about the bundles. But these two philosophers merely stated the problem, and then calmly mistook the statement for the solution. There is at most but a half-truth in what they aver. It is no solution at all to say that the mind is a *uniting* activity. This is only the bare fact over again in other words, accompanied by an appeal from consciousness to unconsciousness, from reason to unreason, from light to darkness, for the explanation. Why go behind the rational evidence, and evoke some blind tendency or instinct, to explain the mind's behaviour in unifying the particulars of sense-knowledge? Is not the harmonious interaction and mutual influence of subject and object a more natural presupposition than that of a blindfold intelligence? Why not try the front door of consciousness, before lifting up the trap-door of the sub-conscious? Why look away from what we can *see* to what, from the very nature of the case, can be known but by analogy, if at all?

It all comes, this tendency to disregard the light of evidence, from a previously acquired theoretical prejudice. Idealist philosophers seem determined to credit the 'subject' with all the work of knowledge. Pragmatists are equally bent on having the 'object' receive the lion's share. We thus witness the rise of monopolists in philosophy as in the social order. Even in conducting the quiet business of knowledge, there is an 'object' trust, and a 'subject' trust to be reckoned with, each trying to wrest control from the other. One wonders unto bewilderment why such one-sided abstractions should continue to retain their hold on men's minds. Must even the subject and the object of knowledge be made to undergo the antagonisms and the competition of our present industrial and commercial life? Do we not rather find these two supposed competitors, acting

on a coöperative plan and sharing the profits between them? Let us hark back to conscious, objective experience, accept the guidance of empirical evidence, and play the game of philosophy 'above board.' It has been kept a game of 'blindman's buff' too long. And when we return from prejudgment to investigation, the unitedness of the object is seen to be a fact of concrete experience. The object manifests itself as a real unity, and that is why the mind unites what streams in from it. The necessity for uniting our sense-perceptions is therefore *objective*; one, that is, for which we see the reason in our conscious experience; not one, for which we are compelled to seek a cause in some sudden uprush of impulse from that mysterious lower region of the mind, which goes by the name of 'subconscious,' largely, we suspect, because it is so far beneath the philosopher's attention.

We may break the thought for a moment at this point to ask a question. Which of the three accounts of the meaning of perception, just exposed, fairly and fully reproduces the facts—the idealist theory which *classifies* the object as 'rational content'; the pragmatist theory which portrays it as a brute fact of sensation utterly *incapable of being classified*; or the realist theory which *lets the evidence alone* until a subsequent cross-examination compels its acceptance or rejection in whole or in part. It is plain to be seen that the two former views are, neither of them, critical investigations of the problem, if by criticism we understand a judicious weighing of the evidence, and not some selective principle or interest of the investigator. The virtue of the realist consists in suspending judgment and postponing decision until a cross-examination enables him to determine how much is 'personal equation' and how much is objective fact. The fault of the idealist and the pragmatist is in asking "leading questions." They thus force matters to an issue prematurely, and cut the evidence in two, each taking that half better suited to his selective purpose. The idealist picks out all the 'thought-elements'; the pragmatist all the elements of sense that were overlooked. And although a rich second harvest is the pragmatist's reward for following in the

swath of such hasty reapers as those who went over the field before him, what does it all amount to in the end, this looking for what you want and finding it, but an attempt to dictate to experience what it *shall* mean, rather than to discover what it *does* mean when taken as a whole? Is all philosophy expressed in the well-worn line,

“Sic volo, sic iubeo; stet pro ratione voluntas?”

### THE JUDGMENT OF EXTERNALITY.

This defensive exposition allows us to repeat with added emphasis the statement made further back, that the first apprehensive act of the mind reveals the presence of objects as concrete individual unities. “It is an important characteristic of perception that we perceive the objects of perception as single objects. As Angell puts it, ‘Although the chair has four legs and a seat, we do not see each of the legs as separate things, and then somehow put them together with the seat, and so *mentally manufacture* a chair for ourselves. On the contrary, our immediate response is the consciousness of a single object. We know, of course, that the chair possesses these various parts, just as we know that it has various colors, and *in a sense* we notice these features when we perceive it. But the striking thing is that despite the great number of sensory nerves which are being stimulated by such an object, we perceive it, not as an aggregate of qualities  $a + b + c$ , but as a unit, a whole, which we can, if necessary, analyze into its parts.’ It is in the same way that our perceptions of *words* take place, and in one respect the fact is more striking. The auditory stimuli are received by the ear not simultaneously but successively, and yet we perceive the word *as a whole*, not as an aggregate of successive sounds. We can, it is true, analyze the word into these sounds, just as we can analyze our percepts of the chair into percepts of its four legs and a seat, but it would be a delusion to believe that we do so in the course of normal speech.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Elements of the Study of Language*, George Melville Bolling, pp. 93-4. Italics ours.



Words as well as things are therefore perceived unities. These unities contain a certain amount of detail, and of particular information, which the mind has to extract piecemeal, and study bit by bit, as is its wont. But, and the disjunction is here used to mark more than a literary transition, before undertaking this study of the particulars in which every object is rich, the mind first pronounces on the object *as a whole*. It affirms the distinct existence outside itself of this concrete unit, whether the instance of such affirmation be the human body, a chair, a desk, a pen, or a myriad other things. It *opposes* itself to the objects which it perceives, and thus becomes conscious of the distinction between its own existence and theirs. This *comparative* apprehension of the object as something existing outside the mind of the percipient, yet making itself manifest within at the same time, is commonly designated as the judgment of externality.

This judgment is based on the direct manifestation which the object makes of itself; consequently on material furnished by perception. This self-manifestation of the object is in turn a simple irreducible fact needing no other criterion than itself, and having none. A criterion is needed only on the false supposition that the mind deals with a 'copy' instead of an 'original.' All need of a criterion disappears, when we forget to confuse means of *communication*, which ideas are, with means of *knowledge*, which they are not. Knowledge in its pure perceptual state is therefore its own criterion. The judgment of externality, which affirms the perceived object as something distinct from the idea we have of it, is consequently the simple expression of a previous apprehension, the careful setting forth of its value, and must be true when consciously made by a mind in healthy condition. Everybody without exception acts on the truth of this judgment. Even the case of victims of neurasthenia, who make realities out of their own disordered imaginings, and "see things" that are not, only goes to prove that imagination is continuous with objective perception, and keeps on reëchoing it, from sheer force of habit, long after the *originally external* stimulus has been withdrawn. Though

often adduced for the purpose, such cases of mental or nervous disorder fail to prove that perception, *when sane*, is discontinuous with 'outside' fact, or disconnected with 'external' reality.

"Let Echo too perform her part,  
Prolonging every note with art,  
And in a low expiring strain  
Play all the concert o'er again."

### THE JUDGMENT OF NATURE.

The judgment of externality is therefore a comparative apprehension of what is, not of what appears to be; unless we should make bold enough to say that the facts of pathology and the hallucinations of a mind diseased afford a better key and clue to the revelations of human knowledge than the facts of normal and healthy experience; in which case, naturally, we should proceed at once to put the cart before the horse. We shall have something to say of this mode of procedure later; to discuss it at length in the present connection would be to anticipate its due time and place. We are still inspecting the position of realism, and not yet engaged in defending it from attack. Were we so engaged, we might venture the criticism that most of the trouble created by the illusionist theory of perception comes from not acknowledging and exploring, on its own account and for its own sake, the apprehensive stage of knowledge which precedes the judicial in all minds, healthy and morbid alike. But something more important presses for consideration at this juncture; it is to indicate still another confusion of which the realist may be as guilty to his sorrow as the illusionist to his premature joy.

There are two judgments, not one singly and solely, made by the human mind with regard to things; the first concerns their existence, the second their nature. These two judgments do not stand or fall together save in our own confused understanding of their respective fields and functions. We have direct knowledge of the existence of things or objects, and only indirect knowledge of their nature. The first half of this state-

ment expresses the pith of the present study; the second half emphasizes a distinction that is more frequently overlooked than pondered. Let all theories as to how these two judgments are effected—whether through the agency of sense, or intellect, or of both in concert—remain in abeyance for the time being, and yield the centre of the stage of attention to the two modest facts mentioned. It is one thing to know *that* reality is, and quite another thing to know *what* it is. We arrive at a knowledge of the nature of things by studying their behaviour, the way they act, or the effects which they produce. Direct insight into the nature of our own mind is not vouchsafed us, and it would be a generous folly to imagine that we are on terms of greater intimacy with the inner self of things than with our own. Is it possible that, in making the truth and reality of things consist in their practical working out and fulfilment of our ideal expectations, the pragmatist has crossed the wires of these two judgments, and short-circuited his whole system?

“How far your eyes may pierce, I cannot tell;  
Striving to better, oft we mar what’s well.”

*Sei dem wie ihm wolle*, as the Germans say. The point which we wish to make is that the judgment of the external existence of objects *affirms nothing* with regard to their inner nature. Hence the “secondary qualities of matter,” so-called, such as sound, color, taste, and the like, form no part of the realist’s main line of defence. *Are things really outside me, and are things outside me really what I say they are*—hot, cold, colored, resonant, sweet, or sour—cannot be treated as identical queries, and the realist refuses to pool issues that should be distinctly considered one at a time. Such questions as the second just mentioned concern the *nature*, not the *existence* of things. The secondary qualities of matter occupy a position in the rear, so to speak, and any attack on them under the impression that the realist is chiefly concerned in their defence at all costs, will be delivered on false ground. The attacking party will repeat Huxley’s experience with regard to Kant—instead of winning



a strategic point, only capture a handful of camp-followers or stragglers.

The realist is well aware, for all his supposed artlessness, that judgments concerning the nature of this specific object or that may contain subjective elements intruded by the percipient. In fact, it is in these judgments that the art of philosophical criticism finds its true place and proper field. Imagination and memory may make an unnoticed contribution from the store of past perceptions, and we may think we are observing when in fact we are but reminiscent. Proof readers know only too well how the imagination spells correctly words that to a slower sight still remain misprinted and misspelled. The likelihood of error increases when we attempt by means of the judgment to reconstruct mentally the character of an object, or a neighbor. Notwithstanding the presence of external elements in thought at its highest as well as lowest levels, it is not always easy to sift the subjective from the objective, the personal from the impersonal in knowledge. In bringing about this consummation devoutly to be wished, the realist cannot be denied his part and share, either theoretically or practically. He draws the line hard and fast at one thing only, and that is the confusion of the judgment of externality with the judgment of internality. These two judgments, he insists, should be considered in the chronological order in which they occur in experience, and care should be taken neither to isolate, nor to confound them unduly.

The agnostic may amuse himself with sundering the two questions of existence and nature completely, and then ask his fellowmen to help him pay for his fault of method by acknowledging that we can know the mere existence of a thing without knowing anything of its nature—an assumption for which there is no ground in sense or reason, but only in pure artifice. The idealist and the pragmatist may merge these two judgments into one, and exhibit things respectively either as God's thoughts, or man's opportunities. But the realist sees no choice in being shipwrecked on Scylla rather than Charybdis. He is of the persuasion that the history of philosophy has shown the

wisdom of that middle course, which steers between 'subject' and 'object' without foundering on either. And he sees in the brilliancy of reaction after reaction against its own forced one-sidedness, the natural effort of human thought in history to regain its lost equilibrium, and to recover a balance that philosophy, it would seem, is more prone to disturb again than to restore.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

## DANTE AS A PHILOSOPHER.

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By a strange irony of fate Dante's great poem has come to be viewed by posterity in a way that confuses with singular infelicity the true perspective of the interests to which the poet wished to appeal. For some, the *Divina Commedia* is primarily political. For others, its artistic excellence is its paramount perfection. For the spiritually minded it is the fullest, richest and most inspiring religious document that the Ages of Faith have bequeathed to us. For almost all modern readers the intense human interest in the poem is its chief attraction. To very few, comparatively, does it appeal as a philosophical work, the product of a mind truly philosophical. Yet, it was the philosophical interpretation of the poem that Dante himself esteemed to be of the greatest importance. In his Dedicatory Epistle to Can Grande della Scala, prefixed to the *Paradiso*, he tells us that the hidden sense of the poem is moral philosophy, the scope of which he defines in the words of the Second Book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Dante, has, indeed, been fully avenged for the wrongs which he suffered at the hands of his Florentine fellow countrymen. The exile has come to his own at last. In "the sacred poem to which heaven and earth have set their hand"<sup>1</sup> he has achieved the renown for which his heart yearned. He who, like the Man of Sorrows Himself, had not where to lay his head, has built up in his own way a mansion wherein the great minds of posterity have found a home. He who experienced how bitter is the bread of the stranger now offers food to the multitude of obscure and illustrious alike who seek the bread of the word. He who knew how hard it is to go up and down the stairways of foreign houses, has drawn all generations of men to tread with him the steps that lead down to suffering and direful woe, to ascend with him the path of purgatorial

<sup>1</sup>

"Il poema sacro  
Al quale ha posto mano e cielo e terra." (*Par.* xxv, 1, 2.)



penance, and at last by the golden stairways of Paradise to attain to endless joy and the blessed immortality.<sup>2</sup> But, while he has thus drawn to him the modern world, he still protests as pathetically as of old:

O ye who have undistempered intellects  
Observe the doctrine that conceals itself  
Beneath the veil of the mysterious verses.<sup>3</sup>

One reason for the failure to recognize Dante as a philosopher is the fact that he was so obviously a theologian. His sacred poem has been described as "Aquinas in Verse"; it is, indeed, a summary of Catholic theology. Even his contemporaries recognized his claim in this regard. The epitaph composed by Giovanni del Virgilio calls him "Dante the theologian," and a tradition dating from Boccaccio's time represents him as having obtained his degree in theology at the University of Paris, but without having been formally inaugurated because he was unable to defray the expenses incidental to that ceremony. But, even if he did obtain his degree in theology, if he did sit at the feet of Siger who

Reading lectures in the Street of Straw  
Did syllogize invidious verities,<sup>4</sup>

that did not prevent him from being a philosopher as well as a theologian. Like his master, St. Thomas of Aquin, he could lay claim to the double distinction. Indeed, the epitaph just quoted confers on Dante this twofold honor:

Dante theologian, skilled in all the lore  
Philosophy may cherish in her illustrious bosom.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ozanam, *Dante and Catholic Philosophy* (New York, 1897), p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> "O voi chi avete gli intelletti sani  
Mirate la dottrina che s'asconde  
Sotto il velame dei versi strani." (*Inf.* ix, 61, 63.)

<sup>4</sup> "Esso é la luce eterna di Sigieri  
Che, leggendo nel vico degli strami  
Sillogezzò invidiosi veri." (*Par.* x, 136, 138.)

<sup>5</sup> "Theologus Dantes, nullius dogmatis expers  
Quod foveat claro philosophia sinu."

In his day the two sciences were distinguished, without being separated from each other. Reason was divine; revelation was reasonable; there could, therefore, be no contradiction between theology, which treated of revealed truth, and philosophy, which relied on human reason alone. The theologian was a philosopher, and the philosopher was almost invariably a theologian.

Again, it is urged that Dante expressed his contempt for philosophy. In the *Inferno* (xxvii, 122, 123) he makes a demon boast of being a logician:

Forse  
Tu non pensavi ch' io loico fossi.

Dante, however, was not always just to his enemies; and if his allusion is to be taken as reflecting on the logicians of his time, it simply shows that he did not approve their methods in logic. He himself was not above the use of rigid logical formulas, as is evident from the *Vita Nuova*, the *Convivio* and *De Monarchia*.

The passage which is, to all appearance, the most serious arraignment of philosophy is the well known speech of Virgil in *Purgatorio*, III, 34, 45. The heathen poet having led Dante to the Mount of Purgatory and seeing how his companion is bewildered at the novel spectacle, turns and says to him:

“Insane is he who hopeth that our reason  
Can traverse the illimitable way  
Which the One Substance in Three Persons follows!  
Mortals, remain contented at the *quia*;  
For if ye had been able to see all,  
No need were there for Mary to give birth;  
And ye have seen desiring without fruit  
Those whose desire would have been quieted  
Which evermore is given them for a grief.  
I speak of Aristotle and of Plato,  
And others many”—and here he bowed his head  
And more he said not, and remained disturbed.”

“Matto è chi spera che nostra ragione  
Possa trascorrer la infinita via  
Che tiene una sustanzia in tre persone.

The passage rightly understood, far from being an arraignment of philosophy, is a vivid and thoroughly human presentation of the legitimate claims of reason. Like the early Christian Apologists, and following the example of the greatest of the schoolmen, Dante pictures the pagan world as longing for the light of Eternal Truth which Christ first shed on man. Virgil himself had shared this longing. Like Plato and Aristotle he had naturally aspired to know the whole truth; with them he had shared the desire "which evermore was given them for a grief." He had had a faint feeling that the dawn of supernatural revelation was approaching, when Faith should shed its effulgence over the realm of supernatural truth, and the mystery of the Triune God should become an acquisition of human knowledge. Because he was denied that vision he bowed his head in grief "and more he said not, and remained disturbed." The pagan world had penetrated the deepest truths of the natural order; it had discovered the *facts*, but could not penetrate the mysterious *reasons* of existence. Had it been able to do so, Christ had not needed to come. For those, therefore, who live in the light of Christian Revelation there are two worlds of truth. The one was known to Plato and to Aristotle: it is the world of philosophy. The other is known only to Christian believers: it is the world of faith, the realm of theological speculation. The second completes and rounds out the first. In the world of faith, is satisfied that desire "which evermore was given as a grief." He is "insane" who would confound the two orders of truth, and hope by unaided reason to reach the heights of supernatural faith. Thus does Dante set limits to philosophic enquiry. Within those limits he recognizes that reason may

State contenti, umana gente, al *quia*;  
 Chè se potuto aveste veder tutto,  
 Mestier non era partorir Maria;  
 E disiar vedeste senza frutto  
 Tai, che sarebhe lor disio quetato  
 Ch' eternalmente è dato lor per lutto.  
 Io dico d'Aristotele e di Plato,  
 E di molti altri." E qui chinò la fronte;  
 E più non disse, e rimase turbato.



satisfy its natural longing, understand its own world, and discover therein a natural knowledge of God.

"Philosophy," he said, "to him who heeds it  
Noteth, not only in one place alone,  
After what manner Nature takes her course  
From Intellect Divine and from its art." \*

How, then, does Dante avail himself of this privilege? What is his manner of philosophizing? Broadly speaking, there are but two methods in philosophy, two ways of achieving the philosopher's task. The one is the Aristotelian, the other the Platonic. The Aristotelian method begins and ends with knowledge. Its starting point is intellectual reflection, its goal is scientific explanation. The Aristotelian philosopher seeks the noumenon in the phenomenon, the universal in the particular. He traces effects to their highest causes. He sees the beautiful, and he analyses it. He discovers the good, the noble, the sublime, and he submits them to logical discussion. He is ever and always asking *Why?* and the answer, if it satisfies his mind, satisfies his soul. The Platonic method begins with wonder and ends in contemplative love. Its starting-point is the appreciation of the beautiful; its goal is intuition of the highest beauty. The Platonist seeks the ideal beautiful in the particular and imperfect manifestations of it. He does not go back from effect to cause but upward from the material, the changeable, the sense-bound, the imperfect to the immaterial, the immutable, the spiritual, the perfect. He discovers the beautiful, but, instead of analyzing it, he loses himself in admiration. He encounters the good, the noble, the sublime hidden in the shadow representations of them in the world of experience, and he is thereby carried in thought to that other world which is above us, the home of the really good, the truly sublime, the ideally perfect. For him experience is always more

\*  
"Filosofia, mi disse, a chi la intende,  
Nota non pure in una sola parte  
Come natura lo suo corso prende  
Dal divin intelletto e da sua arte." (*Inf.* XI, 97, 99.)

than experience: it is a visitation from another and a better world. For him the reason why a thing is, is a secondary consideration, subordinate to the uplifting and spiritually regenerative value of all knowledge.

Now, both these tendencies, the Aristotelian and the Platonic, may be present in one and the same mind. They are not so far apart as one may at first sight imagine. Each in its own way seeks the permanent in the world of change. The searchlight of knowledge is thrown on the whole field of human experience in order to reveal the permanent intellectual element. That is Aristotelianism. The whole world of experience is made to pass through the glowing furnace of personal feeling in order that it may be purified of the dross and only the pure gold of spiritual sentiment remain. That is Platonism. The machinery, so to speak, is different, but the task is essentially the same. The manner is different, the style is different—cold, clear, exact scientific determination in the one case; warm, rich, free poetic expression in the other—yet the aim is fundamentally identical, and the result is also identical. For the true is the beautiful, and the permanently beautiful is the eternally true. In God, whom both the Aristotelian and the Platonist ultimately attain, each in his own way, both find the goal of all philosophical activity, Infinite Thought and Infinite Love, Absolute Truth and Eternal Beauty.

Both these tendencies were strong in Dante. That he was an Aristotelian almost goes without saying. His whole intellectual world was Aristotelian. His mind was endowed with abundant talent for scientific accuracy and correctness of detail. The mould in which education fashioned him was scientific in the Aristotelian sense. The stuff out of which his thoughts were woven with such wonderful skill, the raw material, so to speak, of his poem, was Aristotelian. For him Aristotle was, in his own grand phrase, "*il maestro di color che sanno*," "the master of those who know." So naturally do his thoughts seek expression in the formularies of Aristotelian philosophy that when, in the upper circles of Heaven he is asked by St. John the Evangelist to give an account of the most distinctive

Christian virtue, Charity, he answers, without the least suspicion of incongruity, in the very words of the first Book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*Paradiso*, xxvi, 37 ff.). Human reason, which is his guide through the lower regions, is, indeed, typified by Virgil. Patriotic considerations compelled him to do this, and a strong personal devotion to the legendary, rather than the historical, conception of the Latin poet's relation to Christianity. If it were not for these considerations he might have taken the Stagyrte instead of the Mantuan for his guide. At any rate, the explanations which he puts in the mouth of his leader are often almost verbally taken from the works of the Greek philosopher. Dante knew his Aristotle. Though he depended on imperfect translations, he seized the spirit of the philosopher better than many a modern scholar who studies the original text. "The glorious philosopher to whom Nature above all others disclosed her secrets"<sup>8</sup> was for him the final court of appeal in all questions of purely natural knowledge.

But, while this is undoubtedly true, and admitted by all, it is not less true that Dante was a genuine Platonist. His first hand acquaintance with Plato's teaching was, no doubt, meager enough. Nevertheless he must have known something of the doctrines of the *Timæus*, which was accessible in a translation. He was familiar with the *Consolations of Philosophy* by the Christian Platonist, Boethius. He was fond of quoting St. Augustine's *City of God* and the *Confessions*. From Cicero he gleaned a knowledge, not always accurate, of the doctrines of Plato. But more serviceable far than all these sources was his own spiritual experience, from which, like many before and since his time, he drew his Platonic inspiration. Although he had no immediate knowledge of Plato's works, he had in his own soul an intimate source, a rich fountain of Platonic thought. In fact, his whole life is a vivid, though pathetic, commentary on Platonism. From the moment when, at an early age, he began to be a lover of the beautiful, until the day when he put the last touch to the sacred poem wherein she

<sup>8</sup> *Conv.* III, 5; Oxford ed., p. 277.

whom he had first loved was honored as no woman before her had been honored,<sup>9</sup> his spirit had undergone the Platonic purgatorial process of personal suffering. His mind had passed through the discipline of pagan philosophy and classic culture. His soul had been chastened by penance and Christian piety. He had been rescued from the "withering wildwood," the "selva salvaggia," by faith and repentance. It is, unfortunately, more than a figure of speech to say that in his case

The passionate heart of the poet  
Was whirled into folly and vice.

Through it all he had preserved his ideal. Troubadour and Platonist that he was, he worshipped at the shrines of false divinities, but kept ever in his heart the ideal of spiritual beauty, to which at last he was able to give his undivided allegiance. Had he continued to dwell in the region of primary experience he might, like Petrarch, have become a sweet singer in whose song one personal note would recur in varied cadence. But, he did not choose to do so. Being a Platonist he could not. He made his first vision of the beautiful to serve a higher purpose. He cultivated the spiritually beautiful as the aim of all his thoughts. He sought the higher beauty in all the vagaries of his own fancy, and the record of his search is the *Vita Nuova* and the *Convivio*. Then he planned a still wider search. He sought it beyond his own real experience. In his imaginary journey through all the world of spirits he reviewed all history and all science, seeking everywhere the same Beauty, and finding it at last in God, to the footsteps of Whose throne he was led by Beatrice, the type of Divine Revelation. In this way, by searching for the noumenal, or permanent, beauty amid the phenomena, or "imitations" of it in the world of human experience, Dante became a Platonist, a profoundly personal Platonist. His journey, which began in the "selva oscura," and ended in the vision of Eternal Truth and Beauty, was no

\* "Spero di dire di lei quello che mai non fu detto di alcuna." *Vita Nuova*, n. 43. Oxford ed., p. 233.



irrelevant excursion into the region of fancy. It was a deliberate attempt to interpret all human life, not only in terms of enlightenment, but also in terms of disciplined emotion. It was a quest of the beautiful as well as of the true. By personal feeling, therefore, and by his own spiritual development more than by the study of books, Dante became a philosopher-poet, after the manner of the poet-philosopher. As an Aristotelian he aimed at scientific determination of the actual in terms of essences and causes. As a Platonist, he ranged up and down the universe of human thought and feeling, seeking an interpretation of the actual in terms of the ideal.

In becoming a philosopher of this Platonic type Dante did not cease to be a poet. On the contrary, his philosophy elevated his poetry to a higher degree of artistic excellence. Poetry, when it is merely a play of fancy, without any reference to the serious purposes of life, and without relevance to spiritual values is, indeed, poetry, but it is poetry in the most elementary stage of development. Poetry which to the primary pleasantness that comes from its response to the demands of the ear, adds the deeper beauty which consists in response to the demands of the soul, is poetry in its highest and best form. I do not mean, of course, that poetry, in order to be perfect, must be didactic. What I mean is that poetry is lacking in the supreme quality if it is not philosophical. And I use the word "philosophical" as Aristotle uses it in his famous saying that poetry is "more philosophical than history." History neglects no detail of human experience. It reproduces human life with all its circumstances. Poetry passes over many circumstances as being trivial or unmeaning, and submits the residue to the discipline of harmonious expression. Though in one sense poetry sees less than history, in another sense it sees more; for it sees more deeply. It sees the soul behind the silhouette; it hears the music of the voice behind the silent record of historic sayings. It interprets not only in terms of truth, as the higher kind of history does, but also in terms of artistic feeling and articulate emotion. In a word, it philosophizes. For, the warp and woof of the silken web which

the poet weaves is human experience, in which, like the philosopher, he seeks the permanent amid the fluctuating events. So that in ultimate analysis the business of the poet and that of the philosopher are in part identical.

In this sense the *Commedia* has a transcendent philosophical quality which other poems possess either not at all or only in a lesser degree. No one would deny that there is in the Homeric songs a system as well as a story. Homer has his definite ideas of the gods and heroes, of heaven and earth and the shadowy underworld, of man and those things about which man is chiefly concerned. Those ideas, simple, naïve, childlike, are eternally beautiful and eternally human. Therein lies their charm. But they are admittedly unsatisfying to the developed mind. The Homeric world is such a world as children's fancy might construct; childish, perhaps, rather than childlike. There is in the Homeric conception of existence no reflectiveness, no serious sense of sin, no realization of the need of purification and penance. The religion is a fair weather religion, full of sunshine and gladness, the religion of a people who have not yet felt the deeper spiritual needs which a wide knowledge of even this world arouses. This defect the Greek himself discovered later, when he came to realize through the insight of the tragic poets and the philosophers that there is within us something above nature, something which the beautiful, natural creations of the Olympic world do not satisfy; and from the moment that that discovery was made, the religion of Homer could no longer respond to the spiritual needs of the Greek people. Again, the Homeric conception of religion, while it was artistically rounded out, was fragmentary, from the philosophical point of view. The cultus of each deity was practical, local and, therefore, particular. Whatever underlying principle there was, such as personification of nature, remained vague, doubtful, incoherent. When, now, we turn to Dante we find an infinitely wider range. In his own words, he "leads all wanderers safe through every way" (*Inf.* I, 17), through sin, suffering, penance and purification, to the final joys of the Blessed. If we accompany him we are not always in the

sunshine, but pass from deepest shadow through penumbra into light eternal. And through all our journey we are guided by a definite system, the rational content of which is satisfying to the reflecting mind.

In *Faust* we have the direct opposite of what we find in the *Iliad*. In the Homeric poems all is objective: in the great modern drama there is a preponderance of subjectivity. Indeed, the modern world feels too keenly the subjective aspect of sin and suffering. Its philosophy is too poignantly personal. Thus, the *Weltschmerz*, the tragedy of the world and of human iniquity, is the all too sombre theme of Goethe's masterpiece. It is true, poetry thus gains in richness, fullness and reflectiveness. But even from the artistic point of view the gloom is too dense. Neither the poet nor his audience can penetrate the curtain of subjective feeling that hangs like a mist upon the scene. To the great questions which man is ever asking concerning his own destiny and the meaning of life, there is no answer except Heine's sneer

Ein Narr wartet auf Antwort.

Life is an enigma, which the poet does not solve; because he cannot. Here, too, the onesidedness of the poet's philosophy hampers the action of the poem, and is a defect even from the point of view of art.

If we turn now to Shakespeare, we find a still more interesting problem. Shakespeare, like Dante, swings around the whole circle of human experience in search of material. Like Goethe, he is reflective, but unlike him, he is objective as well as subjective. With him, action dominates feeling, as it ought to. He sees, he feels, he reflects, he analyzes, but when he comes to reflective reconstruction his work remains fragmentary and incomplete. This is not because he is a dramatist, but because his mind is powerless to dominate the whole world of human experience: he does not conquer his world; it conquers him. Like a sailor who would start to sea without compass or chart, he is soon lost in the limitless expanse of human experience.

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player  
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage  
And then is heard no more: it is a tale  
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury  
Signifying nothing.

Shakespeare can rise to the sublimest heights of religious feeling. He is always respectful, and can be even tenderly reverential in his allusions to Christ and Christianity:

Many a time hath banished Norfolk fought  
For Jesu Christ in glorious Christian field,  
Streaming the ensign of the Christian cross  
Against black pagans, Turks and Saracens;  
And, toiled with works of war, retired himself  
To Italy; and there, at Venice, gave  
His body to that pleasant country's earth,  
And his pure soul unto his captain Christ,  
Under whose colors he had fought so long.

He is a philosopher too, as is evident from the study of his Sonnets. In the plays, also, his extraordinary power is nowhere more remarkable than in the ease and sureness with which he disentangles the actuating principle from the mass of fluctuating and confusing details of human characters and human institutions. He possesses in a high degree the philosophical gift of finding the essence in its accidental setting. Indeed, some critics go so far as to assign him a place among the scholastics. "He is distinctly Thomist," writes Father Bowden, "on the following points: his doctrine of the genesis of knowledge and its strictly objective character; the power of reflection as distinctive of rational creatures; the formation of habits, intellectual and moral; the whole operation of the imaginative faculty."<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, he is weakest where Dante is strongest. He is lacking in totality of vision: he fails to grasp all reality, dominate it, and articulate into his conception of it those fragments of philosophy which are unexcelled for depth of insight and breadth of sympathy. Only those who are weary of the world problems, who are content with a restatement of them

<sup>10</sup> *The Religion of Shakespeare*, London, 1899, p. 34.



without a solution, who are ready to cry out in protest against sustained constructive effort in philosophy are satisfied with Shakespeare and hail him as their prophet. His message is Gospel to the agnostic mind.

All this, one may object, would go to show the defects of Homer, Goethe and Shakespeare as philosophers, but does not affect their poetry, by which they are first and last to be judged. The contention, however, is that, in the higher reaches, poetry becomes identical with philosophy, and the deficiencies of the philosophical synthesis necessarily detract from the completeness of the artistic harmony. This becomes evident if we compare for a moment the symbolism of the great poets. Symbolism, in fact, is the contrivance by which the poet introduces reflection, while discarding the rigid technicalities of philosophical systems. Homer's symbolism is the simplest. His reflection is restricted to moral musings on the characters of men, and the result is embodied in epithets expressive of moral qualities: Agamemnon of kingly presence, Hector, the restless, the domineering, Penelope, the faithful, Achilles, the impetuous, and so forth. Here, the thought element is very meagre, while the picturesqueness is at its maximum. In Goethe, especially in the second part of *Faust*, the symbolism is subtle, subjective, overladen with thought-content, but lacking in the picturesque quality. Shakespeare's symbols are direct images. They are taken from the whole range of human experience. But, they are restricted to experience. They are eminently empirical. They have no transcendent thought-element in them; they sum up experience at various times, in various places, and that is all. In Dante's poem symbolism plays an essential part. There the symbolical interpretation is the primary interpretation. And it is a unique system of symbols. The symbols in it are real persons and real objects. Virgil is human reason, Beatrice is Divine Revelation, St. Lucy is enlightening grace; the panther, the lion, and the she-wolf who bar the way, are Lust, Pride and Envy. These are as definite, vivid and picturesque as the Homeric epithets: they are infinitely more rich in thought-content. They are as rich in content as Goethe's

symbols, and incomparably more definite. Like Shakespeare's characters, they are the result of experience and introspection, but in Dante's hands they cease to be empirical. They are moulded into a world system in which the relations, for instance, between Reason, Revelation and Grace, or between Lust, Pride and Envy, are worked out with the minutest philosophical precision. These symbols are drawn from his own experience and from the study of books. The whole world, past, present and to come, all nature, all history, all the speculations of the theologians, all the reasonings of the philosophers, all the dreams of the poets, the men whom he knew, the places which he saw, the incidents of his own sad wanderings, his griefs, his joys, his hopes, his fears, his hatreds—all these furnish material for his symbolism. But, the material was first ordered and arranged into a definite, rational system. It was passed through the transmuting fire of a great love. What results is beautiful, therefore, it is poetry; it is true, therefore, it is philosophy; it is good, therefore, it is moral. In this way, Dante attained the effect which he himself intended, namely, to compose a great poem to which symbolism offered the key; the inspiration of the poem was to be Beatrice, and its purpose to teach moral philosophy. "The subject of the poem," he says,<sup>11</sup> "is man in so far as by merit and demerit he is liable to just reward and punishment." It would, therefore, be unfair to Dante's memory to separate the philosophical from the poetical or the poetical from the philosophical in his work.

"All genius," says Coleridge, "is metaphysical," because it brings us into contact with the ideal. The actual is the realm of talent. Genius of whatever kind, scientific, literary, artistic, philosophical, cannot rest in the actual; it seeks the ideal actualized in what is incidental and accidental. Discovery, in every line of human achievement, is the revelation of the ideal in the actual world, where it is fragmentated, disguised and degraded. It is the ideal that gives meaning and significance to

<sup>11</sup> *Ep. Dedic. Kani Grandi de Scala*, n. 8, Oxford, ed., p. 416.

the actual. Science seeks to unveil the law that lies beneath the everchanging events in the physical world; history seeks to show forth the principles that underly the passing show of human activity, human thought, and human passion; the science of government endeavors to establish harmony in the conflict of human interest, human effort and human aspiration. Poetry and philosophy have a higher aim. They take all nature and all human experience for their kingdom; they range over all knowledge and all human activity in search of the Beautiful and the True. When they, happily, agree, and each in its own way discovers God, then the poet and the philosopher are blended in one; then God is the Beauty, of which the world is a symbol, and the Truth of which the world is an expression, and, like Faith and Reason, poetry and philosophy "make one music as before, but vaster." Philosophy, in point of fact, "lisped in numbers." All the earliest philosophers were poets too. Plato had been a poet in his youth, and he became a philosopher without ceasing to be a poet. The prose of his Dialogues lacks only technical conformity to the rules of versification to make it numbered diction of the highest order. No wonder, then, that Dante succeeded in combining so happily the poetic gift with the philosophical. Look at that face of his in Giotto's immortal fresco. There you see, as Carlyle says, "the softness, the tenderness, the gentle affection, as of a child." You see in it also the pride of genius, the stubbornness of invincible resolution, an intelligent obstinacy, a masculine strength and sternness. There is there at once the gentleness of the Platonic lover of spiritual beauty and the forcefulness of the Aristotelian scientific genius. As a Platonist, he felt, he suffered, he expiated his own folly, and through grace attained salvation. As an Aristotelian he set out systematically, first to conquer the technical difficulties of his art, then to acquire his material by the study of science and theology, and lastly to coördinate, systematise, and dominate the whole field of knowledge, like another Alexander, looking for more worlds to conquer, until his task was accomplished and he had in reality brought beneath the sceptre of his genius the whole

world of nature and of human nature. But, if he submitted his own soul to the discipline of suffering, and subjected his mind to the restraint of classic culture, if he attained through infinite toil to a final domination of human experience for the purpose of his poem, the inspiration that sustained him through it all was his love for Beatrice and his resolve to honor her as no woman had been honored before. Therefore, while the body, so to speak, of his work was Aristotelian, the soul of it was Platonic. He conformed to the fashion of the troubadours, but rose immeasurably above them in seriousness of purpose. A troubadour, then, in externals, he was an Aristotelian in intellect, and a Platonist in heart and soul.

It remains to consider briefly another title by which Dante can claim to be a philosopher. In common, current, phrase, a philosopher is one who has mastered his own moods, who is so securely entrenched in his own convictions that he is proof against all the assaults of "outrageous fortune," one who has learned to bear the untoward events of life with calmness, imperturbability and even cheerful resignation. To meet misfortune "philosophically" is to meet it with patience and noble self-repression. To be a philosopher is, in homely phrase, "to burn one's own smoke" and not blacken the landscape of one's own and other minds with the products of those fires that "try men's souls." This is the Stoic notion of philosophy, and the Stoic keyword is "self-mastery." Now, Dante, both in theory and in practice, showed his appreciation of Stoicism. Among the most singular of all the verdicts he pronounced on the heroes of antiquity is that which he passed on Cato the Younger, the saint, so to speak, of Roman Stoicism. Dante did not place him in the inferno of the suicides, nor in the limbo where the other great pagan heroes are gathered; he could not place him in the Church Suffering nor in the Church Triumphant, because Cato had not seen the light of Grace. Consequently, he assigned to him the task of guarding the gates of Purgatory:

"I saw beside me an old man alone,  
Worthy of so much reverence in his look,



That more owes not to father any son

Reverent he made in me my knees and brow."<sup>12</sup>

This post Cato is to hold until the day of Judgment, when on account of his natural virtues he is to be admitted to the company of the Blessed. Another indication of Dante's Stoic inspiration is his frequent, and singularly beautiful references to light. Light was the Stoic symbol of truth and of God, and readers of the *Divina Commedia* know the use that Dante makes both of the reality and of its symbolism in the gloom of the Inferno, in the pale atmosphere of the mount of suffering, and in the ascent to the dazzling effulgence which surrounds the Godhead in Heaven. Without detracting from the sublimity and tenderness of Milton's address to Light, one may echo Dinsmore's verdict that "No poet has been more keenly sensitive to light" than Dante.<sup>13</sup> As Dean Church so beautifully expresses it "Light everywhere—in sky and earth and sea; in the star, the flames, the lamp, the gems; broken in the water, reflected from the mirror, transmitted pure through the glass, or colored through the edge of the fractured emerald; dimmed in the mist, the halo, the deep water; streaming through the rent cloud, glowing in the coal, quivering in the lightning, flashing in the topaz and the ruby, veiled behind the pure alabaster, mellowed and clouding itself in the pearl—light contrasted with shadow, shading off and copying itself in the double rainbow, like voice and echo; light seen within light; light from every source and in all its shapes illuminates, irradiates, gives glory to the *Commedia*."<sup>14</sup> For Dante, then, as for the Stoics, light is the emblem of truth and peace, and all man's endeavor ought to be to let the blessed light illumine

<sup>12</sup>

"Vidi presso di me un veglio solo,  
Degno di tanta riverenza in vista  
Che più non dee a padre alcun figliuolo

Riverenti mi fe' le gambe e il ciglio." (*Purg.* I, 31-51.)

<sup>13</sup> *Aids to the Study of Dante*, Boston, 1903, p. 341.

<sup>14</sup> *Essay on Dante*, p. 387.

undisturbed his own soul. "Love," he says in the *Convivio*,<sup>15</sup> "is the informing principle of philosophy, and it manifests itself in the exercise of wisdom, which brings with it marvelous delights, namely *contentment under all circumstances and indifference to things that enthrall other men.*" He was, then, a theoretical Stoic, his Stoicism being, of course, tinged with Christian moderation.

In practice, too, he was a Stoic. He sought to realize the Stoic ideal in his own life. It is this ideal that reconciles the apparently contradictory descriptions of him left us by Villani and Boccaccio. Villani says "Like other philosophers, he was stern, nor did he readily converse with unlearned men." This was the Stoic *gravitas*, the disdain for the vulgar crowd. Boccaccio on the contrary, tells us: "He was remarkable for courtesy and good breeding . . . . He bore all his adverse fortunes with true fortitude, nor did he ever yield to impatience or bitterness, except in his political trials." This was the Stoic self-mastery, a virtue which he acquired in the school of suffering. He tells us himself how bitterly he suffered in exile: "I have passed through all the regions to which this language (Italian) reaches, a wanderer, almost a beggar, displaying, against my will, the stroke of fortune, which is often unjustly wont to be imputed to the person stricken. Truly, I have been a ship without a sail or helm, carried to divers harbors and gulfs and shores by that parching wind which poverty breathes."<sup>16</sup> At home as well as in exile, he led a life apart from the world in which he dwelt, and it was only by his high resolve, by his love and faith that he was conducted along hard, painful and solitary ways to "the lofty triumph of the realm of truth." We may picture him as he appears in the story of his visit to the monastery of Santa Croce del Corvo in the Lunigiana. "He moved not, but stood silently contemplating the columns and arches of the cloister. And again I asked him what he wished, and whom he sought. Then slowly turning

<sup>15</sup> III, 13, Oxford ed., p. 290.

<sup>16</sup> *Conv.* I, 3, Oxford ed., p. 240.

his head and looking at the brethren and at me, he answered 'Peace.' " This peace he attained, Stoic-fashion, by self-mastery. But, at the cost of a struggle. There were discordant elements in his character. He was by nature proud, bitter, almost acrid, in his hatreds, unconciliating, unforgiving. Listen to his expression of disdain for the cowardly and indolent:

"Speak not of them, but look and pass them by." <sup>17</sup>

From the traitor Alberigo's frozen lips in the depths of the cold crystal of Cocytus, he hears unmoved this plaintive prayer: "For pity, break the ice upon my face, that I may weep a little while, before my fount of tears freeze up again." Dante will not do the traitor even this facile favor, but answers with terrible severity

"To be rude to him were courtesy." <sup>18</sup>

Now, look on another picture and see the fine sensibility of the man. When, in *Purgatorio* XIII, he meets the host of the Envious, who for punishment are blinded, he remarks

"To me it seemed a want of courtesy,  
Unseen myself, in others' face to peer." <sup>19</sup>

These and other opposing tendencies of his character were finally harmonized by the help of Christian Stoicism. Once he had reached self-mastery all the divergent passions of his soul were reconciled in the one grand Stoic trait, Magnanimity:

"Come after me and let the people talk;  
Stand like a steadfast tower that never wags  
Its summit for the blowing of the winds." <sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> "Non ragionam di lor, ma guarda e passa." (*Inf.* III, 51.)

<sup>18</sup> "E cortesia fu lui esser villano." (*Inf.* XXXIII, 150.)

<sup>19</sup> "A me pareva andando fare oltraggio,  
Veggendo altrui, non essendo veduto." (*Purg.* XIII, 73, 74.)

<sup>20</sup> "Vien retro a me, e lascia dir le genti;  
Sta come torre ferma che non crolla  
Giammai la cima per soffiar dei venti." (*Purg.* v, 13-15.)

And again

"To stand four cornered to the blows of fortune."<sup>21</sup>

The soul, confident in its own courage and strength, contemptuous of everything mean and petty, despised the fainthearted and the cowardly. Of the spirits who in the heavenly war took part neither with God nor with Satan, he says in scathing phrase

"These have, then, no hope of death."<sup>22</sup>

This lofty, proud Stoic soul—"buttressed it is on conscience and impregnable will"—speaks to us through the solemn, stern deathmask. There, too, as in Giotto's fresco, there are not wanting traits of tenderness, refinement and a peculiar feminine softness of outline; but over all is the Stoic trait, Self-mastery. If the fresco in the Bargello is the portrait of the youthful Platonic lover, the deathmask is the true image of the mature Stoic philosopher.

Such, then, was Dante the philosopher. He has an acknowledged right to stand, as Raphael represents him, among the disputants in theology, a noble, austere, figure, somehow alone, in spite of the distinguished company, somehow apart from them all—his head neither encircled with the halo of sainthood nor crowned with the tiara or the mitre of ecclesiastical dignity, but enwreathed with a simple garland of laurel—a poet among theologians. He has an equal right to a place in the companion picture, the school of philosophers. There, indeed, he should be at home, with Plato, whose idealization of love he imitated, with Aristotle whom he honored as "the master of those who know," with the Stoics whose severe dignity and noble self-mastery he admired. There, in that exalted company he might have occupied an honored place, a poet among the philosophers.

WILLIAM TURNER.

<sup>21</sup>

"Ben tetragono ai colpi fortuna." (*Par.* xvii, 24.)

<sup>22</sup>

"Questi non hanno speranza di morte." (*Inf.* iii, 46.)



## NOTES ON EDUCATION.

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### PRIMARY METHODS.

Under the title "Bending the Twig" in the March number of the *American* magazine, Addington Bruce gives an account of the youthful marvel who is just now attracting so much attention at Harvard. This sketch is valuable for many reasons. The author speaks from intimate personal knowledge of the boy and presents the father's interpretation of the case as well as his own. The father, Boris Sidis, is a psychologist of international reputation. He conducted the education of his child himself to test recent psychological theories of primary instruction. Of course no one will contend that a single case proves the theory, but neither will any one familiar with this phase of psychology regard this case as a solitary instance in anything but degree. We hope that every primary teacher in the country will read this article in its entirety. We shall reproduce a few paragraphs of it here for the purpose of illustration. "There is at Harvard University to-day a student who has caused much astonishment, perplexity and debate among the members of the faculty. He is only eleven years old. At an age when most boys are struggling desperately with the elements of education, this lad is specializing in advanced mathematics, and, since his admission at the beginning of the college year last September, has easily held his own with fellow students in most cases more than twice his age. Indeed, even before coming to Harvard he had progressed far on the road towards mastery in the science of mathematics. Algebra, trigonometry, geometry, differential and integral calculus—all these he had at his fingers' ends by the time he was nine or ten. He has even written a treatise on the properties of the hypothetical 'fourth dimension.' What makes the case of this child-undergraduate still more amazing is the fact that, unlike almost

every other 'infant prodigy' of whom history gives any account, his marvelous precocity is far from being confined to a single department of knowledge." We are further assured that the boy is simple, child-like, and free from the self-consciousness that so frequently marks the unusual child. The boy's father attributes this marvelous development entirely to the method employed in his education; a method having as its "chief purpose the training of the child to make facile, habitual, and profitable use of his hidden energies." The father who has trained such a boy surely has the right to a respectful hearing when he speaks of the latent power of the child-mind and of the means by which it may be roused and utilized in the process of education. He says, "The notion that the young child's mind should be allowed to lie fallow is utterly wrong and pernicious. The child is essentially a thinking animal. No power on earth can keep him from thinking, from using his mind. From the moment his inquiring eyes first take in the details of his surroundings he begins the mental processes which education is intended to guide and develop. He observes, he draws inferences from everything he sees and hears, and seeks to give expression to his thoughts. Left to himself, he is certain to observe inaccurately and to make many erroneous inferences. Unless he is taught how to think he is sure to think incorrectly, and to acquire wrong thought habits, causing him to form bad judgments respecting matters not only vital to his own welfare but also important to the welfare of society. In fact, in order to get the best results, his training in the principles of correct thinking should begin as soon as, or even before he starts to talk. There need be no fear of overtaxing his mind. On the contrary, the effect will be to develop and strengthen it, by accustoming him to make habitual use of the latent energy which most people never utilize at all."

After giving an account of how Dr. Sidis taught his child to read by playing with letter blocks, putting them together into words and pointing out the objects signified, Dr. Bruce gives an account of the way the child learned to use the typewriter. "At the age of three and a half, for example, he

chanced one day to wander into his father's office while Dr. Sidis was writing a letter on a typewriter. He watched the movement of the carriage back and forth, he heard the clicking of the types, the ringing of the bell, and forthwith tugged eagerly at his father's coat. What was that machine for, he demanded, how did it work, and many other questions. Then, climbing into his father's lap, he pressed his little fingers on the keys, and exultingly read the words his father showed him how to form. This first lesson was followed by others, until within six months—when he was only four years old—he was typewriting with considerable dexterity. He had already learned how to write with a pencil. When he was six—his parents having in the meanwhile removed from New York, where he was born, to Brookline, Mass.—he was sent to a public school. His career there was brief but spectacular. In half a year he passed through seven grades, leaving behind him a succession of bewildered, wild-eyed teachers, aghast at the precocity he displayed. An interval of two years of study at home was followed by three months of attendance at the Brookline high school. Then two years more of study at home, and now, as has been said, he is a special student at Harvard, toying with vector analysis and other forms of higher mathematics." These results are truly startling and they bring to the surface many problems which will be studied with eager interest by every student of child-psychology and by every one interested in the education of children. Leaving aside for the present the psychological problems involved, we will turn to a further study of the method by which Dr. Sidis attained these results.

The purpose of the special education given to this boy was to train him to utilize those hidden energies which the vast majority of people never make any use of. "To attain this object Dr. Sidis has, in the main, relied on the familiar educational principle of teaching the child through appealing to his interest, but he has made the appeal to interest in an unusual way—namely, by systematic application of the influence of that little understood but tremendously powerful psy-

chological factor, 'suggestion.' Now, suggestion is no mysterious or uncanny force, operable only under exceptional conditions. Everybody knows what is meant by a 'suggestive teacher,' a 'suggestive book,' a 'suggestive picture'. By suggestion is meant nothing more than the intrusion of an idea into the mind with such skill and power that it dominates and, for the moment, disarms or excludes all other ideas which might prevent its realization." There is food for thought here for those who are concerned with the teaching of religion to young children. Arouse their interest, plant the thought in their minds in such a way that nothing will prevent its realization: this is, in a nutshell, the whole purpose of our work and, let it be added, nothing less than this will suffice. Whatever might be the case with other branches of knowledge, there is no question in any one's mind that realization in conduct is the purpose of religious instruction. And let it be added that the method so frequently employed to-day of making the child commit to memory the answers in a catechism which, both in thought and in wording, are entirely beyond the child's comprehension, cannot attain this result. Even if there were room to discuss the question on the theoretical side, practical experience has long since settled the matter. Let us turn, then, to Dr. Sidis and study the way in which he attained this end in the education of his child. "In dealing with little children, as many educators have long since recognized, one sure way of implanting in their minds the ideas which one wishes to make dominant is by arousing their curiosity and stimulating their interest. This has led to the method of education through play, as exemplified in the kindergarten. But Dr. Sidis believed that, if properly manipulated, the method of education through play might be extended to subjects not taught in the kindergarten—that, in fact, a child might be led to undertake and continue the study of any subject provided it were made sufficiently interesting to him. To-day, as we have seen, his son excels in mathematics. There was a time, however,—while he was at the grammar school—when no subject could possibly have been more distasteful to him, and he seemed totally un-



able, or at all events unwilling, to apply himself to it. Discovering this, Dr. Sidis did not attempt to drive him to the study of mathematics. Instead, he purchased some toys—dominoes, marbles, etc.,—with which he invented games requiring more or less knowledge of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Every evening, for an hour or more, he played these games with his little son, deftly managing matters so that his interest in time shifted from the toys to the principles underlying their use. In the boy's presence, too, he continually discussed with Mrs. Sidis—who has throughout loyally coöperated with her husband in this unique educational experiment—questions involving the practical applications of arithmetic and 'suggesting' its importance in the affairs of every day life. This process proved so effectual that the boy spontaneously, and with the greatest enthusiasm, took up the study of mathematics, progressing in it so rapidly that in a couple of years his mathematical knowledge was superior to that of his father. The same method has been followed by Dr. Sidis in stimulating him to the study of other subjects to which at first he showed indifference or positive dislike. The result has invariably been the same. Once really interested, he has gone at every subject with eagerness and enthusiasm, grasping and mastering its principles with amazing ease. Nor is this the only way in which Dr. Sidis has made use of suggestion to stimulate his son's intellectual development. Everything about us, as is now beginning to be pretty generally appreciated, is of suggestive value. From our friends, our books, the very pictures on our walls, from everything in our environment, we constantly receive suggestions which influence us to a varying but none the less unmistakable extent. This is particularly true of the plastic period of childhood. Recent psychological investigation has made it certain that everything the child sees or hears, no matter whether he is consciously aware of it or not, leaves a more or less profound impression, is 'subconsciously' remembered by him, and may at times exercise a determining influence upon the whole course of his life."

There is opened up here a whole field of psychology that is

bristling with interest for the primary teacher. In fact, there is nothing more common at every stage of the educational process than the complaint that the pupils have no interest in a given subject and the conclusion is usually taken for granted that the subject in question should either be omitted or that the pupils should be made to learn it and trust to an interest developing later on, when, as a matter of fact, the chief business of the teacher is to create an interest in the subject that he teaches, and this is not to be done by forcing the child's appetite. But let us hear further of Dr. Sidis' method. Dr. Bruce tells us that Dr. Sidis arranged "his son's environment so as to cause it to radiate upon him suggestions quickening and enlarging his intellectual capacities. While the boy was a mere infant, he set aside a room for him, a bright, cheery, well-lighted apartment, hung with a few attractive pictures. A little writing table was placed in one corner of the room, with pad and pencil. Opposite the child's bed a small bookcase was placed. It was filled in part with the ordinary books of childhood—volumes of nursery rhymes, fairy tales, picture books. But it also held books of serious interest, simple tales of travel, of history, of science, and the like, most of them illustrated. As the child grew older, books of more advanced character were added to his little library, studies in literature and biography, mathematical and scientific text-books. A large revolving globe, showing the countries of the world in bright colors, was placed near the window. Toys having a scientific basis also found their way to his room, which thus became a sort of educational museum, inspiring him with a love for knowledge. 'And,' says Dr. Sidis emphatically, 'it is because he has been inspired with such an interest, such a genuine enthusiasm, that he has made the progress which people regard as surprising. Any normal child would make as good a showing if he were given the same training. The trouble is that parents neglect their children—allow them to fritter away their energies, to acquire habits of loose and incorrect thinking, at the very time when they stand most in need of careful education. It is the first years that count the most. Then it is that the child should be taught to

observe accurately, to think correctly. I do not mean by this that the child should be deprived of play. My boy plays—plays with his toys, and plays with his books, and that is the key to the whole situation. Get the child so interested in his study that study will truly be play. Don't tell me that it cannot be done. I have done it.'” While this is the most remarkable, it is not the only experiment of the kind that Dr. Sidis has carried on and, therefore, he speaks on the subject with some authority.

Dr. Sidis lays much stress on the element of play in his son's education, still it must be at once apparent that he is using the term in an unusual sense. Play is employed, it is true, but interest in his work is the core of the method employed, and if this be the criterion, then play and not work is the name we must give to all real worthy achievement, whether of children or of adults. It is only when we work for the sake of the thing we are doing, led on by our love of what we are accomplishing and our enthusiasm in the pursuit, that we ever really accomplish anything worth while. If this be called play, then we have no quarrel with Dr. Sidis' contention. And, moreover, theory and experiment alike prove that work under these conditions does not produce the disastrous results which so frequently accompany the labor of those who have no interest in what they are doing but work for wages or the prize that may be awarded. In these cases the motive is indirect, no matter how high or worthy it may be, and the result is strain that soon makes its appearance in the impaired health of the child or of the man. The thing, therefore, to be avoided is not over-work, but work under wrong conditions. Work that flows wholly from native interest may, of course, be carried to excess but the danger is not imminent.

Dr. Sidis' method is characterized by another feature which we have often pointed out in this series of articles. In arousing his child's interest, he begins with the concrete and the tangible and by a judicious procedure leads the child to make his own abstractions and to arrive at underlying principles. When the boy showed a dislike for mathematics, if he had been

compelled to go through long drills in number work and to memorize tables, it is not probable that he would to-day be surprising any body by his mathematical skill. Dr. Neil Arnott, in his *Elements of Physics*, written in 1826, gave clear expression to this same truth. "Most persons find attention to pure or abstract mathematics as irksome as the study of mere vocabulary of a language. This explains why so small a proportion of students, if taught in the common way, become good mathematicians, and why, where pure mathematics are made the avenue to Natural Philosophy, this also is so much neglected. It is remarkable how much the really simple and attractive science of comparing quantities has been rendered terrible to the great mass of mankind. The mode of proceeding is just as if a man, to whom permission were given to enter and possess a magnificent garden, on condition of his procuring a key to open the gate and measures of all kinds to estimate the riches contained within, should waste his whole life on the road in polishing one key or in procuring several of different materials and workmanship and in preparing a multiplicity of unnecessary measures." The whole trend of Arnott's plea is that the pupil should be made familiar with the concrete phenomena that interest him and be led into the possession of pure science and abstract principles as his need for these arises.

Dr. John W. Draper, Professor in New York University, wrote in 1847, in his *Natural Philosophy for Schools*, "The main object of a teacher should be to communicate a clear and general view of the great features of his science, and to do this in an agreeable and short manner. It is too often forgotten that the beginner knows nothing and the first thing to be done is to awaken in him an interest in the study, and to present to him a view of the scientific relations of those natural objects with which he is most familiar. When his curiosity is aroused, he will readily go through things that are abstract and forbidding, which, had they been presented at first, would have discouraged or perhaps disgusted him." Dr. Draper is here speaking of instruction in Physical Science, but the principle he



enunciates is of universal application and nowhere is its application more imperatively demanded than in the teaching of Christian Doctrine. "The great general features" should be presented to the child in "an agreeable and short manner." The first thing to be done is to awaken the child's interest in the subject instead of beginning, as we too frequently do at present, with the abstract formulations of theology. The only way in which we may give the child a clear and fruitful understanding of these same abstract truths is by leading him up to them through attractive, concrete presentations of the truths in embodiments that touch the child's imagination and arouse his enthusiasm. This has been our constant aim in the preparation of the text-books which we are preparing for the elementary grades of our Catholic schools. There is hardly room for dispute as to the correctness of the principle, whatever may be said as to the skill with which its embodiment in the books has been accomplished. Those who are interested in this phase of method will find an admirable development of the theme in the January number of *The Teachers College Record*, by John F. Woodhull, Ph. D., in which he urges a return to the earlier ideals in the teaching of physical science. The paper is particularly suggestive for those who are engaged in the work of teaching Christian Doctrine. He shows clearly that the attempt made in the last few decades to approach the teaching of physics through the abstract principles of mathematics and pure science has resulted in loss of interest and failure in the accomplishment of any worthy results. He urges a return to the earlier methods which began with the concrete and tangible things of the pupil's environment where interest may be easily aroused and from this led the child on step by step to the formulation of general principles and to an eager pursuit of pure science. The history of the teaching of Christian Doctrine enforces the same conclusion. Wherever the subject has been approached from the side of the abstract formulations of theology, the result has been a dissipation of interest and failure to make the truths operative in the ordinary affairs of life. The converse of this seems to be

true in the early history of the Church and wherever the teaching of religion has been approached from the practical side and from the concrete embodiments of Christian Doctrine in human events and in the lives of the leaders of religious movements.

There is one other conspicuous feature in Dr. Sidis' method which deserves the close attention of the catechist, namely, the scope that is given to the phenomena of suggestion. In the Catholic school, of course, there are many things that rain in upon the child religious suggestions, such as the religious habit of the teacher, the crucifix, religious pictures, exercises of devotion, etc., but the suggestion of most vital importance comes from the place that religious truth holds in the whole system of truth which is being imparted. If the child finds God and religion in every subject that he turns to, he naturally grows up into a comprehension of the fundamental truth that God is the beginning and end of all things; that to know Him is the highest achievement of the mind and to love and obey Him the most important concern of life. On the contrary, if religion be banished from the school, as is the case in the public schools, or if it be separated out from the remaining work of the school and taught as a thing apart, the suggestion tends to make the child regard God and religion as a fifth wheel. Again, if nature study, geography, and the other secular branches are presented to him in beautiful books and illustrations, whereas religious instruction comes to him in the form of a cheap three cent catechism, the inevitable suggestion to the child is that the importance of religion is to the importance of the other subjects in the same ratio.

#### PRIMARY TEXT-BOOKS.

Primary text-books that are dominated by alphabet methods or phonic methods in any of their various forms are out of harmony with the secure findings of genetic psychology and it has been shown that they defeat the larger purposes of education. The content of these books is usually of a fragmentary nature and of little or no importance, since it is their form and

not their content that engages the child's attention and finds lodgment in his developing consciousness. Except for the purposes of linguistic science and for the art of proof reading, it is the content lying back of the printed page and not the form of words and sentences that should absorb the attention of the reader. Where this is reversed, as in the case of the proof reader, attention to broken type, punctuation and incorrect spelling frequently exclude the thought completely from the mind of the reader. If the habit of attending to the form of the words instead of to the thought back of them be firmly established in the child's mind during the first two or three years of his school life, it is only in isolated cases that he will ever escape in after life from its tyranny. Such children are condemned by the mistaken methods of the primary school to remain strangers during all their lives to the world of wisdom and truth and beauty bequeathed to them by the countless generations that have enshrined their noblest thoughts and highest aspirations in the literature of the world. Now, the mental habit that we wish to enthrone in undisputed control of the adult mind should be the first to be developed in the child's consciousness and the primary text-books which, through mistaken methods, fail to do this may be dismissed from further consideration, since they fail to meet a fundamental requirement. It should be remembered, however, that we are not here condemning the use of phonic methods as a means of developing correct enunciation, or even in a subordinate capacity as a help to the child in recognizing new words.

The first qualification of a primary reader in accordance with the demands of genetic psychology is that it possess a content of such absorbing interest to the child as to relegate the formal element to a secondary place in his consciousness. The printed word is but a means to an end and this relationship must be maintained from the beginning throughout all the phases of the child's acquisition of the difficult art of reading. The method employed in the education of the Sidis boy is an illustration in point. He is taught to read as soon as he is able to speak and in the one case as in the other the word is

related directly to the thing signified, and it is his interest in the thought content that leads him to the employment of written language no less than of spoken language. It is the same in the beginning of his mathematical instruction. This in the case of teaching elementary reading might be summed up in the single phrase *teach new words by context*; approach them from the thought element; and employ them where necessary in the use and development of the thought. If any teacher will take the trouble to ascertain what pupils in the higher grades have learned to read before they came to school with apparently little or no teaching from any body, she will be more than rewarded for her trouble. On inquiry she will find that these pupils have learned to read almost wholly by context and she will further learn that they are among the most thoughtful readers in the school. There has been altogether too much of the formal element interjected into the teaching of reading in the primary rooms. The teacher seems more anxious that the pupils should recognize a certain number of isolated words in a given length of time than she is that he should be able to get the thought from a printed page. Many teachers also are convinced that the child should not look for the thought until he is first familiar with all the words. This is an inversion of the natural order which is responsible for a large percentage of the poor work in our schools, not only in reading but in all the subsequent branches of study in which the children depend largely on the printed page for information.

While interest for the child is the first qualification of a primary text-book, it is neither the only nor the most important qualification. A content that deals exclusively with play as an end in itself may for a time possess an absorbing interest for the child and it may help him in his mastery of the art of reading, but the lasting injury thus inflicted upon the mind and character may easily outweigh the benefits. Dr. Sidis speaks of using play in arousing the interest of his child in mathematics, but he also points out the fact that he so arranged the games as to lead the child to a use and to a comprehension of the underlying principles. This is, in reality, using play



as a means to an end, and if the end chosen be proper, it would seem to be entirely free from objection.

Again, the doings and actions of the beast world, because of their simple and elemental character, may make a strong appeal to the child's interest, but if they are presented to the child in such a way as to develop his sympathies for brute attitudes to the exclusion of the higher elements, the result will be a leveling of the child down to the brute, for in this case the brute attitudes will dominate the child's imagination and become the models for his imitation. This is the chief fault of all those primary readers that exclude religion and human life and confine their content to descriptions of the animal and plant worlds. The brutalizing tendency here referred to is greatly strengthened in such books as the *Tree Dwellers*, the *Cave Dwellers* and the *Eskimo Stories*, where the child is not only busied with the animal world, but where his senses and his imagination are filled with the lives and actions of primitive, savage, or decivilized peoples who live down to the level of the brutes whom they slay and whose raw flesh they devour. In educating his child, it will be noticed that Dr. Sidis was not led by any distorted views of the culture epoch theory to surround his child with the environment of early savage life. On the contrary, in the appointments of his room, in the pictures, in the books that surrounded him and in the conversation which he was permitted to hear we find the standards of civilization and culture everywhere prevailing. Of course such books as those to which we have just referred could not be tolerated by any one but materialists or by teachers who are profoundly ignorant of the laws governing the mental and moral unfolding of children. These books may have the virtue of truthfulness in the eyes of men who deny the existence of God and of a spiritual world and who regard man in the light of a highly developed animal, but even to such a man, if he knows anything of psychology, the books must be intolerable from the suggestions they give which tend to drive the child back towards early types instead of lifting him to a higher plane of civilization. But the Christian regards them as inadmissible also from an ethical

standpoint; to him they are the embodiment of a base and degrading lie which robs the child of his spiritual inheritance. To satisfy the requirements of genetic psychology and to meet the demands of Christian philosophy, the primary text-book must present to the child material that is interesting to him. And, moreover, this interesting material must be such as will lead him by the pathways of virtue to the feet of the Creator. The culture epoch theory demands that the child begin the development of his conscious life on the brute plane, or on a plane that is but slightly removed from it, whereas, the Church and biological science both demand that the child begin his mental development on the highest plane attained by the race. To illustrate once more from the method employed by Dr. Sidis: He used dominoes and blocks and devised games with these concrete things that would awaken the child's interest, but the highest knowledge of mathematics which he possessed guided him in the selection of these games. They embodied in germinal form his highest knowledge of mathematics and were consequently a vastly different thing from the games of savage children undirected by any teacher.

In demanding that the child should begin the individual development of his conscious life on the highest plane attained by the race, we are not forgetting the needs of the child-mind as contrasted with the mind of the adult. All the truths that are to enter into the substance of the growing mind of the child must be presented in a concrete and germinal form, since the child is wholly unable to deal with the abstractions made by others. But the truths themselves which are presented to the child should be the very highest in the natural and supernatural orders. The child's mind is adjusted to the whole, to the large outline, it is incapable of dealing with detail. It is busy with the sentient phenomena which pour in upon it from the physical environment, and this material should find its way into the primary text-book. Our children do not live with Pleistocene men nor with Eskimos, but if we are desirous of making Pleistocene brutes or Eskimos out of them, it would be difficult to find a more effectual way of attaining this end

than by placing books of this character in the hands of the children and requiring them to read them and to carry out the objective work therein indicated.

By a judicious use of the resources of the child's environment, the primary text-book may help to quicken his sympathies for sentient life in all its forms, but the constant aim should be to impress upon him man's superior nature and to give him an abiding sense of the grave responsibility which God has laid upon his shoulders. The bird and the flower, the savage and the beast of the field, may all be presented to the child if, as in the Gospel parable, they are made the mirrors of higher truths.

The primary text-books designed for use in the first and second grades which have recently been published under the titles *Religion, First Book*, and *Religion, Second Book*, were designed to meet the above requirements. The first of these books has been dealt with at considerable length in the earlier numbers of this series of articles, the second book must now occupy our attention.

### RELIGION, SECOND BOOK.

*Religion, Second Book*, like its predecessor, is intended as the book of the grade. It is designed to fill the place of a reader, leading the child to a knowledge of written language through the thought expressed. The new words are so woven into the context that their meaning may come home to the child with but little effort on his part. The content deals with the familiar surroundings of the child and with his home life. These are presented in such a way as to capture his interest and to lead him into a knowledge of the truths embodied in the religious stories. All of the material is arranged with a view to its availability for the presentation of the religious lesson. The general plan of the book is the same as that of *Religion, First Book*. It is divided into seven chapters. In each chapter there are four parts, viz., a nature study, a social study, a religious study, and two songs which gather up the

main sentiments of the chapter. But in spite of the resemblance in structure between the two books, certain important differences may be noted at once. The *First Book* dealt with the five fundamental instincts which determine the infant's attitude towards its parents. The endeavor was there made to transform these instincts into the foundation of a Christian life. The child shares with the mammal an instinctive reliance upon parental love. The human infant and the young mammal are guided by the same instincts in turning to their parents for nourishment, for protection in the hour of danger, for remedy in suffering, and for the models of their imitative activities. In so far as these tendencies are instinctive in the human infant, they are purely selfish, but when transformed by a realization of the parental attitude to which they correspond, they become the foundation of all that is best in human life. In the very highest reaches of man's spiritual development he never transcends these attitudes. They enable him to lift up his face to his Heavenly Father with a sure reliance upon an answering love, while he asks for daily bread and begs for protection against temptation and for deliverance from evil. And his Heavenly Father must always remain to him the highest model for his imitative activities. "Be ye perfect as your Heavenly Father is perfect."

*Religion, Second Book*, aims at leading the child to a higher plane through suggestion, imitation, and through his comprehension of law and his obedience to it. Where the *First Book* appeals primarily to the child's instincts, the *Second Book* appeals to his intellect, his imagination and his experience. From one point of view the book might be aptly termed the book of obedience, as this expresses its dominant tone and its underlying purpose, at least as far as its effect on the child's character is concerned. When looked at in this way, the seven chapters of the book will be found to present to the child seven phases of the virtue of obedience.

The Annunciation is the central theme of the first chapter. The obedience of Mary to the will of God receives the highest reward that could be conferred on a creature in the Child Jesus



whom the Heavenly Father sends her. In the second and third chapters the first end of obedience is developed in the private prayer of the shepherds and in the ceremonial worship of the Magi. The fourth chapter aims at bringing home to the child a realization of the fact that God in giving His Commandments seeks the good of the creature as well as His own glory. He sends His angel to bid the Magi return by another way and to warn Joseph of the danger that threatens the Holy Family. The nature of perfect obedience is developed in the fifth chapter in connection with the finding in the temple. The Child was about His Father's business, but when constituted authority spoke from the lips of Mary and Joseph, He left the temple and went down to Nazareth and was subject to them. The result of perfect obedience is shown in the way that all nature obeys the command of Christ, who Himself was a perfect model of obedience to the will of His Heavenly Father. The consequences of the first great disobedience are shown in the sixth chapter, while the last chapter deals with the return of the children of Adam to the Kingdom of God.

In form as well as in content this book has undergone a modification so as to enable it to meet the changing phases of mental development in the child. The most important of these changes, when considered with regard to its function as a reader, are a steady increase of approximately ten per cent. new written words in each of the stories. The sentences grow progressively more complex. The staccato form of the sentences gradually yields to a more smoothly connected discourse. More details are presented in the word pictures, and the thought and style prepare the child for the New Testament stories in approximately the words of the Gospel. Choice verses from the best authors are given where the context serves to bring out the meaning for the child. As an aid to the development of the child's powers of observation and expression, each story is followed by a set of written questions. As the book proceeds, short passages from the Scriptures which express the thought of the lesson are given to the children to memorize. The illustrations wherever possible are reproduced from recognized masterpieces. These

pictures are used to help the child to a realization of the thought contained in the lesson, while they incidentally give him an acquaintance with the masters and cultivate his artistic taste. The nature studies become exact and detailed. They prepare the child for the beginnings of geography and lay the foundation for a knowledge of the most familiar phenomena of nature. The winged seeds, typical trees, the function of the sunbeams in generating vapor and melting snow, the winds, the streams and rivers, the ocean and the storms, are all presented to the children and many of the relationships of these things to each other and to human needs are brought out, while each truth in the nature study is at the same time made the basis of the moral and religious lesson.

There is a sequence in the thought that links together the various parts of the book and maintains a continuity of interest for the child. While every line in the book was written with a view to the development of the child's knowledge of his material and spiritual environments, there is no appearance of didactic drills, which would lessen the appeal that the book makes to the heart of the child. He is led to read himself into the life of the plant and the animal and thus to glorify them instead of reading the life of the lower creatures into his own life and thus lowering himself to their level. He is led to lift his eyes up to high human and Divine ideals for his inspiration and for the models of his imitative activities. In the hands of a competent teacher the book can scarcely fail to cultivate in the child a taste that will lead him to the pure fountains of literature and fill him with an aversion for the cheap, the tawdry and the vulgar.

It will scarcely be disputed by any one who has given thought to the matter that among the first requirements of the teacher should be numbered a complete mastery of the subject to be taught and next to this should be placed adequate professional training which will reduce to law the task of imparting what is known to the pupils. While the content of the curriculum in the second grade is small when considered in the light of adult standards, it is large when compared to that of the primary

grade and its importance cannot well be over stated, for the truths in question must be selected with a view to the entire future of the child's development. These early years are preëminently the seeding time. The germs planted in the child's mind will bear fruit according to their kind in later years. It is for this reason that such care must be bestowed on every thought that is embodied in a primary book and upon every tendency that the child is allowed to develop and upon every habit of mind and body that he is allowed to form.

The primary text-book, it needs scarcely be said, should mean entirely different things to the child and to the teacher. The child need realize no more than is on the surface. To him an acorn is an acorn. But the teacher should be able to see in the acorn the sturdy oak. She should be penetrated through and through with the spirit of the text-book which she uses in her room. She should realize not only what each truth presented means to the child to-day but also what it will mean to him when he has grown to man's estate. What we shall have to say of *Religion, Second Book*, therefore, is for the teacher, not for the child. To the child the book speaks for itself and it can scarcely fail to reveal its deeper meaning to the teacher without any further exegesis. Nevertheless, it has been thought well to give some account of what the authors have attempted to embody in this little text-book.

The central thought in the first chapter (pp. 11-39) is the mystery of the Annunciation. In the *First Book* the Lord's Prayer was developed as well as several articles of the Apostles' Creed. The endeavor was made to bring home to the child in the first grade, according to the measure of his capacity, the meaning of "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, the Creator of Heaven and earth, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, Our Lord, who was born of the Virgin Mary." The article "conceived by the Holy Ghost" was omitted, because it was deemed wiser to defer its development for a few months. There is no special objection to doing this, since the child's mind does not move in such a chronological sequence as to demand the development of this thought before he is made ac-

quainted with the Nativity and with the Child Jesus. It is difficult to present to the young child the mystery of the Incarnation in such a way as to convey to him any real meaning while avoiding a discussion of the deeper mysteries of life, for which his mind and heart are not yet prepared.

In the first chapter of *Second Book* the attempt is made to deepen the child's sense of the worth of life and to give him some realization of the fact that children are the greatest blessings that God can bestow upon His creatures here on earth. This is accomplished in some measure by showing the child that the highest reward which it is in the power of God to bestow upon the Blessed Virgin is to make her the mother of His Son. This chapter naturally leads to the development of the Hail Mary and the Angelus, just as the first chapter in the *First Book* culminates in the Our Father. The first two parts of the chapter must of course be determined with reference to the central theme in the religious lesson. The nature study with which the chapter opens must hold this sublime theme as its central and inmost thought, while it is at the same time an accurate presentation of some elemental truth in nature which will serve to lead the child into a sympathetic understanding of the lowlier forms of life with which he is surrounded. This has been attempted in the story of the three little milkweed sisters. Obedience in the widest sense of the term characterizes Flossie who was considerate of others and who labored that she might have wherewith to minister to their needs. She lived out in her own lowly way the life which Our Lord commended in the parable of the sanctions when He said: "Come ye blessed . . . For I was hungry and ye gave me to eat, thirsty and ye gave me to drink." She is consequently made the center of interest in the story and she is presented in such a way as to secure the children's sympathy. Fluffy and Flitter are characterized by the two radical vices of children, greed and vanity. These vicious tendencies lead Fluffy and Flitter to break the seventh commandment by taking what is not theirs, and the children's hearts as well as their heads will approve of the penalty meted out to them. And thus is brought home to them



the fundamental Christian truth that the wages of sin is death and the reward of virtue life everlasting. To obtain the full fruits of the story, however, it should be preceded by an object lesson on the milkweed, such as that usually given in the first grade or in the beginning of the second. The lesson is essentially as follows: The teacher has a ripe milkweed pod, but before showing it to the children she draws from them a statement of the various things of special interest which they have in their homes. Some mention toys, others dolls, others pets, but when a child announces that he has a new baby in his home, everything else fades into insignificance for the time being. The child is then led to tell about the baby; how he is dressed in long white clothes and laid in a cradle. And then the milkweed pod is opened and the children are shown the milkweed babies in their cradle. But there are too many of them to grow in one cradle so the wind disperses them. Some of the children play the part of the wind and with their breath scatter the milkweed babies. After this the children are shown the picture of the milkweed in blossom and with the ripe pod. After a preparation such as this, the children will enter with zest into the spirit of the three little milkweed sisters and from the story they will learn many important biological truths, such as the mode of dispersion of the winged seeds. The seeds that fall in cultivated places and remain there are destroyed because they are not where nature intended them to grow. The proximity of the thistle and the briar to the natural habitat of the milkweed, the goldfinches on the thistle, which is one of their favorite feeding places, and their home in the elder bush, where they frequently build their nests, are all facts which many of the children may easily be led to verify for themselves. The milkweed, throughout the northern belt of our country at least, blossoms at a time when most of our flowers are suffering from the summer sun. The butterfly carries the pollen which fertilizes the milkweed. Thus the child is in reality led into a sympathetic understanding of fundamental biological truths. We would, indeed, find it difficult to present more matter within the same space limits if we had no other care than to familiarize

the children with nature, but, as we have already stated, this is but the outer covering, the setting of the jewel.

There are four little poems presented in connection with this lesson. These the children might well be required to commit to memory. The poem with which the second part of the milkweed story begins is intended to suggest to the child the central thought of the story which follows and thus, in some measure, to prepare him for it. The same is true of many of the other little poems with which subsequent stories begin. The poems at the end of the stories, like the songs with which the chapters are concluded, naturally grow out of the context and contain for the child some important thought of the lesson in a beautiful form which is likely to remain with him and to help to cultivate his taste for good poetry. "For the world is full of roses" reminds the child that all this natural beauty finds its source in the father's love. And "I know, blue, modest violet" serves to recall to the children's minds the doctrine of Creation developed in the first chapter of the *First Book*. The series of questions at the end of this study will help to develop the child's observation of the natural phenomena of his environment. They will also emphasize for him the moral lesson which the story contains. The objective work, of course, is little more than a suggestion which may be amplified or varied to suit the circumstances and the inclination of the teacher. The child's interest in the three little milkweed sisters will be heightened somewhat when he realizes that the scene of it is laid in the garden of his old friend May, with whom he became acquainted in the *First Book* (p. 50).

In the social study which follows under the two divisions, May's Birthday, and The Secret, the central thought of the nature study lesson is rendered more explicit and a model is set for the children's imitation along lines of activity calculated to incorporate the truth into their characters. The fruit lesson discussed in *The Psychology of Education*, pp. 251-253, and in the *University Bulletin*, Vol. XIII, p. 401, should be given before these stories are read. In this way the sense training and the nature study will blend with each other and form an

adequate preparation for the social study which follows, while the social study will strengthen and give meaning to the nature study. The nature study acts as a setting for the parable and adjusts the mind of the child to the social situation. There are some incidental features of this lesson which will hardly escape the teacher's notice. Thus, it was a very commendable thing in Mr. Wood to begin the celebration of May's birthday by attending Mass with her, and it is edifying to have him thank God for having given him the best little girl in Brookfield and to pray for a little brother for her. The child, of course, is not ready to comprehend the adult questions here involved, but the suggestion will nevertheless produce its effect and help to develop a tendency along right lines in the youthful hearts of the children which later on may be lifted into functional activity in the storm and stress of adult life. The impression made by this story with its bright imagery will do more to leave a permanent attitude in the child's mind against a social evil of which much complaint is made to-day than would much preaching and moral suasion in later life.

The pious Catholic practice of dedicating children to the Mother of God and clothing them in her colors during their first seven years of life, is mentioned in the story in the hope that it may tend to revive the beautiful custom that was fraught with so many blessings to Catholic womanhood. The child of to-day too frequently celebrates a birthday in a purely selfish and pagan orgy. An ostentatious display and gorging with cakes and ice cream too frequently round out the children's celebration. All this, of course, comes from the fact that the children know no better; they are following the example of their elders in so far at least as they understand it. The beauty of May's conduct will not be lost on many children. Her own birthday becomes doubly valuable in her eyes from the fact that it is also our Lady's birthday. She was engaged in making preparation for its celebration all summer, not by thinking of herself, but in watering and caring for the lilies that she might have something to offer to her Heavenly patron. May's father and mother utilized the occasion to mould her character

and direct the aspirations of the children.<sup>1</sup> The children at May's birthday party are led to perform one of the corporal works of mercy in saving the best fruit for their companions who are at home sick, and they end the day as they began it at Our Lady's altar offering her the tribute of their love and asking her intercession to obtain for them the most precious gift which the Heavenly Father could bestow upon them, a baby brother for May.

As the nature study naturally blends with the social study and prepares for it, so both the nature study and the social study prepare for the religious lesson in which the thought culminates. Kaulbach's "To Earthly Home" is not only a sweet, artistic conception of the origin of human life but in the present instance it is a peculiarly happy preparation of the child's mind for the mystery of the Incarnation. The beauty and appropriateness of Father Tabb's little poem, "A Bunch of Roses," will be recognized by every teacher of little children.

The religious lesson of this chapter is divided into four parts. While it may seem at first sight a needless weakening of artistic unity to go back to King David, nevertheless, on mature reflection we decided upon this course chiefly for the following reasons: The references in the Gospel to Christ as the Son of David are so frequent and so important that it seems well for the child to understand this allusion from the beginning. This also applies to the stories of the Nativity and the Holy Night and gives a reason for the trip to Bethlehem as the City of David and for the choice of Bethlehem as the objective point in the return from Egypt. There is also a second very important consideration: Our Saviour always described Our Heavenly Father's attitude towards us as that of a loving father towards his children, but himself He spoke of as a Shepherd of Souls, and in departing from this world He established His Church to perform this function, saying to Peter: Feed my lambs, feed my sheep. All the tenderness and the loving affection implied here was understood by the shepherd folk to whom

<sup>1</sup> Compare this lesson with the method outlined by Dr. Sidis in the education of his son.



He spoke, but our children for the most part have no comprehension of the attitude of the shepherd towards his flock. They know nothing of the clinging dependence of the sheep or of the loving, brooding care of the shepherd, nevertheless, it is highly important that they should be given as vivid a realization of this as possible in order that they may not lose the force of the truth illustrated by this similitude in the Gospel. David as the shepherd boy fills the imagination of the children. His tenderness for the lambs, his companionship with the flock to whom he played on his harp, and his heroic rescue of the lamb from the lion's clutches, are all calculated to arouse the child's enthusiasm. God's approval of this conduct gives it a further sanction and makes it a potent influence in moulding the child's character. The implicit obedience of David to the higher impulses of his own nature gave him the strength required to slay the lion without the use of spear or sword. His prompt obedience to God's will enabled him with so inadequate an instrument as a pebble and a slingshot to destroy the giant clothed in his brass armor with a mighty sword for his defence.

The second and third parts of the story, Mary's Parents, and Mary's Childhood, are obviously required in order to bring out Mary's obedience to God and to constituted earthly authority, an obedience which earned for her the priceless privilege of becoming the mother of God. As in the case of King David, St. Joachim and St. Anna help to prepare the child's mind for the more sublime virtue of Mary. The motives that sustained them in their toil were that they might be able to promote the glory of God by contributing to the Church and to the relief of the suffering of the needy by giving food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty and clothing to the naked. This lesson is designed also to correct the false social standard which so generally obtains amongst us. St. Joachim and St. Anna, though poor, were loved and respected by everybody and God Himself recognized their merits by giving them Mary for a daughter.

In the story of the Presentation in the Temple the first germ of a religious vocation is planted in the child's heart. In the precious child given to their care, God gave them the one thing

that these good people craved, nevertheless, in recognition of their stewardship, they take the child to the temple and dedicate her to the service of God. Titian's picture of the Presentation will help to bring home to the children a realization of this. The parents are left below while the child ascends the steps of the temple to be received by the priests on the part of God. Nor did this dedication consist in any mere ceremonial offering to be through with at the end of the day. As the child's mind unfolded, she was taught, day by day, to turn her heart and soul towards her Heavenly Father and to yield to Him a perfect obedience. St. Anna taught her little daughter to read so that she might fill her mind and heart with a knowledge of the great things that God had done for man, and particularly for His Chosen People. Mary read the Sacred Scriptures lovingly that she might learn how to obey God's will more perfectly. This lesson should come home to the parents and teachers who are responsible for the development of the child's taste in reading quite as forcibly as to the child himself. Too often, in present practice, the words, sentences and style presented to the young child in his first excursions into the world of books are such as serve to lead him as far away from God as possible. They lead him into a world that knows not God and help to form a taste for the purely secular and for the trashy and ephemeral in literature. In these cases it is the teacher and the text-book and not the child which have sinned. Attention has been called to the fact more than once that the present books were written with the deliberate purpose of cultivating a vocabulary and forming the child's taste with reference to the Bible, a book which has played so important a part in the creation of our best models of English style.

The final story, The Annunciation, is naturally the climax and the culmination of the various lines of thought embodied in the chapter. The vocabulary as well as the thought of the preceding stories prepares the child for this sublime scene. This may be seen, for example, by comparing the opening paragraph of May's Birthday (p. 20), with the opening paragraph of the Annunciation (p. 31). "May's heart was bursting with

joy as she ran down the steps into the garden. The flowers were sparkling with dew. The sun was just peeping over the hill. The catbird was singing in the lilac bush." The thought and the vocabulary here will remove all difficulty from the child when he comes to read the opening paragraph of The Annunciation. "It was spring. All the world was glad. The pure white lilies in the garden were sparkling with dew. The birds were singing their morning songs." The story about May caring for the lilies for Our Lady's altar should be compared with this paragraph also. The second paragraph of The Annunciation also presents scarcely an unfamiliar word or thought, as may be seen by comparing it with the preceding stories. The story of The Annunciation is told in the words of the New Testament with very slight omissions and changes which seemed necessary in order to bring the matter within the child's range of comprehension.

The advantage of presenting the Hail Mary to the child in this way is too obvious to need emphasis. Henceforth, whenever he shall say the Hail Mary, the words will be likely to bring to him a vivid picture of many things which will work for his good. The questions added at the close of this lesson may be regarded as a page from a child's catechism. The answers, however, are not given, because the child should be led to give the answers in his own words and in his own way. Later on, when his thought has been sufficiently developed, he will be led to formulate exact definitions. The function of the two songs given at the close of the chapter is the same as that of the songs in the *First Book*.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

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**Memoirs of Scottish Catholics** during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Selected from hitherto inedited mss. By William Forbes Leith, S. J. Longmans, Green & Co., London and New York, 1909. 2 vols., pp. xvi + 381 and xii + 415.

The memoirs which make up these two volumes consist for the greater part of letters written by Jesuit missionaries in Scotland to their Superior General in Rome. Not all the letters were actually written from Scotland, a good many are dated from places on the continent; but because of the activity of the English secret service at the time, the writers wherever they were felt it necessary to be extremely reticent regarding the names and residences of their friends in Scotland. The memoirs in the first volume are all from Jesuit pens and cover the period between 1627 and 1649: those in the second volume, which also contains a large number of Jesuit letters, are drawn from several sources and include some very noteworthy documents, *v. g.*, that entitled, "The Rev. John Thompson's Account of the State of Religion in Scotland from 1688 to 1787, compiled from letters and other original monuments." The letters written by the Jesuit missionaries are either reports from individuals to the Superior General in Rome or Annual Letters written by the Superior of the Society in Scotland containing a chronological account of principal events of interest to the missionaries or the church during the year. Most of the documents are drawn from the Stonyhurst archives, though other sources have been laid under contribution, especially the Jesuit archives abroad.

Making allowance for the restrictions under which the missionaries lived and their limited means for acquiring information except in regard to what came under their personal observation, their correspondence gives an excellent picture of the condition of Scotch Catholicism during this period of persecution. The fact that persecution and persecutors are the same in all ages is made clear on every page. For any one who is acquainted with the writings of the early Christians, these narratives have a familiar



ring. "In the first place, all Catholic priests were proscribed, and a reward of five hundred marks promised to any one who should apprehend a priest and deliver him into the hands of a magistrate. To render this law more effectual, a power was given to apprehend any Catholic reputed to be a priest; and to convict him of being a priest, no other proof was required than if he refused to abjure his religion; upon which conviction he was to be banished out of the kingdom, with the assurance that if he returned he should be punished with death." Six other statutes, equally harsh, ordering the sequestration of the property of Catholics and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, suggest the legislation of the Roman Cæsars in the second and third century. The first persecutors of the church excogitated nothing so brutal and inhumane as we find in the last of these seven statutes drawn up in the seventeenth century: "that the children of Catholics, being minors, should be taken from their parents and put into the hands of Protestants to be educated, and the parents be obliged to pay for their education and maintenance according to their station."

The anecdotal character of the memoirs crops out on every page, and this, with the personal note inseparable from such writings, lends the documents a peculiar charm. It is interesting to read of the punishments inflicted on persons who profaned or defiled things which the Catholics held sacred, numberless examples of divine retribution for such deeds are related. Not so edifying perhaps is the account of the ignorance and superstition of the Calvinists. In the Annual Letter of 1657-58 we read: "It is well known that in those parts of the country where the pestilence of heresy was spread, the worship of the devil has spread at the same time, and the people are there more addicted than elsewhere to the use of sorcery, magic, charms, and spells. Evidence of this may be seen in every part of the country. It is the commonest sight in the world to see whole regiments of wizards and witches carried through the air, or over the fields, moving in bands as if they were armed forces, and many individuals have against their will been compelled to join them, and returned to their homes with their hair on end, their eyes gleaming, their minds distraught, calling aloud, to their own terror, and to that of all who heard them, that they were afraid the devil was going to carry them away again."

The Jesuit missionaries, the number of whom was not on the

average more than ten, usually confined themselves to the lowlands where they generally acted as chaplains to the families of wealthy Catholics. The difference in language was naturally a ban to any work among the Celtic speaking Highlanders: but in 1670 a Father arrived "familiar with the Erse language, used by the mountaineers of Scotland, and labored with great success among them." The difficulty of providing for the spiritual needs of the Highlanders was overcome by the introduction of Irish priests, who "notwithstanding the hardships they labored under, continued firm and constant to their stations with great zeal during the revolution, and having contracted an attachment to the country and people by their long residence among them, were resolved that they would live and die with their poor people, as well as to satisfy their own conscience before God, as to give them a good example."

Scotland was during those two centuries anything but a pleasant abiding place for a priest. When Father Andrew Leslie, S. J., was being transferred to the prison in Edinburgh, he relates that at one place on his route "a priest was regarded as being of a different species from other mortal men, and young and old crowded out of the town of Drumlithie to look at me, so that I was conducted on my way by a procession of young boys and girls." That these missionaries were able to carry on their ministrations and braved imprisonment and death is what may be expected, but the best tribute to their zeal was the large number of conversions which they made among all classes of people. Isolated as they were among a people mainly hostile and dependent entirely on the support of their poor co-religionists, the missionaries were at times reduced to sad straits.

The memoirs contain much that will be of interest to the student of Scotch history. They will be especially valuable for the way they illustrate the workings of the new doctrines and the development of sects among the argumentative Scots. To the followers of John Knox the record of intolerance which is here unfolded will not be pleasant reading. No one, however, be he Catholic or non-Catholic, can deny a full tribute of admiration and praise to the faithful Scotsmen who clung to the old faith in the face of such obstacles and at such a tremendous cost.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

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**Saint Ignatius Loyola**, by Francis Thompson. Edited by John Hungerford Pollen, S. J. With 100 illustrations by H. W. Brewer and others. Benziger Bros., 326 pp. \$3.25.

The Life of St. Ignatius, by Francis Thompson, has a sure merit, and that a great merit. We are prepared by the Preface not to expect of it original research—that was beside Thompson's plan. "He purposed to tell—if he could, to tell better—a story thrice told by others." A biography ruling out the substantive element of originality of matter might connote little else than a translation, but no translation this. It is a personal document of the truest sort, directly Thompson's own work, rich with his own thinking. He seems less to appropriate or translate others' findings than to transmute them into his design. Never is he more an original artist than here, artist and original in selecting, in coördinating, in imparting spirit to the matter and then—that other half of all original work—in giving it being in his own style. The resultant whole is a Thompson, not any other thing. Selection was not easy in a field so filled with facts, incidents, events, anecdotes and persons. Thompson chooses the salient things, the features that "leap on the eyes," whether for social or individual characterization or for mere personal portraiture. In this way, fundamental characteristics of the time, the people or the person are laid down as a working basis. There is this firm structural framework, and into it the very spirit of the day is recalled and from it communicated. The spirit of the sixteenth century is reached through the leverage of Ignatius and his comrades. Anecdote and incident, thus wittingly chosen, are so interwoven with the aid of a powerfully-working and well-controlled imagination that out before one rolls as in a drama or a pageant the varied and vivid life of that tremendous era. As biography, as history, and as a personal record it is valuable. It throws a new light on Francis Thompson, while it speaks professedly of the saint. A sufficiently complex life was Ignatius', and his time, besides its main drift, one of innumerable cross currents. Not an influence that bore on Ignatius is neglected. Thompson follows him from Pamplona to Manresa, from Montserrat to Palestine, and on step by step through the long march of his crossed career. At all points truth waits on admiration, while sympathy assists judgment. Never, to our knowledge, at least, in English hagiography has such essential justice

of matter been coupled with so great a sympathy of spirit, the whole carried off with an incomparable style. Here precision is divorced from pedantry, and learning given wings. It is a company of live men this book presents, yes, and a live boy—the immortal Ribadeneira; Favre, Salmeron, Xavier, Rodrigues, Broet, Borgia—we know them all, painted at full length and to the life true. An examination of Thompson's English predecessors in this field convinces us, as his executor declares, that there is here no originality of invention, but there is more: there is the reconstruction of an epoch. Francis Thompson has given us a biography that is in very truth alive, convincingly and radiantly real.

CHARLES L. O'DONNELL, C. S. C.

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**Commentaire français et littéral de la Somme Théologique de S. Thomas.** Par le R. P. Thomas Pègues, O. P. (E. Privat, 14 Rue des Arts, Toulouse). Tome III, Traité des Anges. Tome IV, Traité de l'Homme.

Father Pègues' activity is remarkable. The first volume (De Deo Uno) of his translation and commentary on the text of the *Summa* was published in 1907 (see *Bulletin*, Jan., 1908). The following year brought to light the treatise on the *Trinity* (*Bulletin*, Jan., 1909), and the treatise on the *Angels*. Now we have the fourth volume, containing the treatise on *Man*.

Since no part of the *Summa* is omitted in the commentary, the third volume might have been entitled: Creation. Distinction of things in general. The distinction of good and evil. The distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures, The creatures purely spiritual, *i. e.*, the *Angels* (for plan of the *Summa*, see *Bulletin*, April, 1909). In like manner the fourth volume contains not only the tract on *Man*, but also the very important tract on the creation of the visible world—the work of the six days. Some writers have not hesitated to call St. Thomas' treatise on the angels the most beautiful tract of the *Summa*. His doctrine concerning the influence of the good angels and of the evil spirits has been applied in a very practical manner to burning questions of our days (*e. g.*, Spiritism, Hypnotism, etc.) especially by Father Lepicier. In the treatise on creation St. Thomas, with almost super-



human foresight, prudently refrained from adopting irrevocably any one of the different interpretations of the first chapters of Genesis which were known and discussed in his time. As Father Pègues justly remarks (Preface to vol. iv) his method, which was progressive and yet respectful of tradition, received a striking approbation in the decisions of the Biblical Commission dated June 10th, 1909. The first three chapters of Genesis contain history (not legends or myths); nevertheless there is room for great liberty in interpreting the historical narrative.

Father Pègues has been appointed Professor of the second part of the *Summa* in "The Angelico," the new international house of studies of the Dominicans, recently established in Rome. It is to be hoped that his new duties will facilitate rather than retard the continuation of his excellent translation and commentary.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

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**Francia's Masterpiece.** An Essay on the Beginnings of the Immaculate Conception in Art. By Montgomery Carmichael. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., Dryden House, Gerrard Street. 1909, 12mo., pp. xxxi + 167.

This volume on the Beginnings of the Immaculate Conception in Art is intended to serve as an introduction to a much-needed work on the subject.

Strange as it may seem the iconography of the Immaculate Conception has, as we learn from the author, "been singularly neglected both by writers on Art in general, and writers on Marian iconography in particular." Pictorial representations of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception are described by many of them as representations of the Assumption or Coronation, and Mrs. Jameson in her *Legends of the Madonna* has stated "that the Immaculate Conception does not appear in Art until the seventeenth century." Yet, as Mr. Carmichael shows, "the doctrine was, without question, pictorially represented above Altars at least from 1479 onwards, and between this date and the early seventeenth century, a great variety of curious and beautiful representations, all altarpieces for Altars, were painted, some by the greatest artists, for the churches of Italy."

Among these the masterpiece of Francia, the subject of the

present study, holds a foremost rank on account of its great value. "The beautiful, simple, deeply mystical form excogitated by the Franciscans, the champions of the Dogma in the last quarter of the fifteenth century illustrated by Francia's picture is rare, and did not last long." This altarpiece was painted, as the author shows, sometime between 1511 and 1517, at the request of Donna Maddalena Statia for the chapel of the Immaculate Conception, founded and endowed by her in the old Lombard Basilica of San Frediano at Lucca. The following is an outline of it. The Eternal Father is seen seated in the Heavens above, surrounded by the heads of cherubs and two adoring angels. He touches with His life-giving sceptre the head of the Queen of Virgins humbly kneeling at His feet. Beneath upon earth four figures are standing. On the right hand King Solomon is seen, a scroll in his hand bearing the inscription: *TOTA PULCRA ES AMICA MEA ET MACULA NON EST IN TE* (Cant. of Cant. IV, 7), and beside him is King David striking his lyre with one hand and holding a scroll in the other with the inscription: *IN SOLE POSUIT TABERNACULUM SUUM* (*Ps. XVIII, 6*). To the left are seen St. Augustine on whose scroll are written the words: *IN CELO QUALIS EST PATER TALIS EST FILIUS; IN TERRA QUALIS EST MATER TALIS EST FILIUS SECUNDUM CARNEM* (Serm. 20 ad Fratres, Migne, *P. L. XL, 1267*), and St. Anselm on whose scroll we read: *NON PUTO ESSE VERUM AMATOREM VIRGINIS QUI CELEBRARE RESPUIT FESTUM SUE CONCEPTIONIS* (Sermo de Concept. B. V. M., Migne, *P. L. CLIX, 322*). Kneeling in the foreground between these four figures is a Franciscan Friar with a flame of fire in his hand, apparently St. Antony of Padua—all without a halo. Between the Franciscan and King David a low structure is seen which at a superficial glance resembles an open tomb, but its quadrate if not sexagonal shape, the lilies sprouting on the hither side of it and roses on the farther side and not within the structure, the absence of the Apostles always attending the tomb of the Virgin, prove it to be no other thing than a well, the "hortus conclusus and fons signatus." A tomb would be utterly meaningless in this picture. Below the magnificent altarpiece, once separate therefrom as the predella, but now inclosed in the same gilt frame, are four exquisite little chiaroscuro sketches which, as the author proves, portray miracles wrought through the intercession of Mary Immaculate.

One is astonished to learn from the author that this picture is

described by writers on Art as an Assumption, Coronation, etc. Mr. Carmichael devotes a special chapter to the proof that it can represent nothing else than the Immaculate Conception.

His conclusion is confirmed by another picture now in the Pinacoteca at Lucca, but formerly in the Church of San Francesco in that city, painted by an unknown author, probably a Friar of the adjoining monastery for the Confraternity of the Immaculate Conception founded in that Church about 1477. From this picture Francia has taken, nay literally lifted, the whole idea of his sublime masterpiece. The same Saints, with like scrolls, bearing the selfsame words as in Francia's picture are found in it. At the foot of each figure is a label with the name of the Saint and the Franciscan is labelled St. Anthony of Padua. In this picture it is Our Lord and not the Eternal Father who touches with His sceptre the kneeling Virgin. On a scroll peculiar to Our Lord are the words: NON ENIM PRO TE SED PRO OMNIBUS HEC LEX CONSTITUTA EST. (Esther xv, 12-15). On Our Lady's scroll is written: ERUISTI A FRAMEA DEUS ANIMAM MEAM. (*Ps.* XXI, 21). The Franciscan Friar who in Francia's picture unlike the four other Saints, bears no witness to the truth of the Immaculate Conception upon earth, but looks up into Heaven as if he saw the Heavenly vision and divined the Dogma, proclaims it upon earth in the other picture. On his scroll we find the words: VIDE-TUR PROBABLE QUOD EST EXCELLENTIUS ATTRIBUERE MARIAE. These words taken from the works of Scotus (Vol. xiv, in III Sent. Dist. 3, Qest. 1.) lead the author to conclude that the Franciscan in question is not as the name would suggest St. Anthony, but another great son of St. Francis, the Ven. John Duns Scotus, the champion of Mary's greatest privilege. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that St. Antony is in no way associated with the development of the Dogma nor is there any reference to it in his writings or lives. The altarpiece at San Francesco was painted for a Franciscan Church, and was inspired, designed and controlled by the Franciscans. The liturgy and theology are without a flaw. The Friars who had been under the influence of Fra Paola da Lucca, a champion of the dogma and author of the *Symbola de Conceptione Beatae Mariae*, could not possibly attribute the familiar words of Scotus to St. Anthony. The only reasonable theory therefore is that the kneeling figure is intended for Duns Scotus. The name of Anthony is a ruse to avoid a difficulty. Although

natural and fitting, it would have been extremely rash in 1480 to represent uncanonized Scotus with a halo among canonized saints. Hence the Friars wrote beneath the kneeling Franciscan the name of Anthony, but introduced the words of Scotus to show all Friars present and to come whom it was intended to depict. Such is Mr. Carmichael's argument which is very ingenious and carries with it great probability. Moreover, in so far as Scotus is here put on the same level with Anselm, Augustine and David, and granted the halo of a saint, Mr. Carmichael hopes that this picture may serve as a valuable bit of evidence in connection with the pending process of Scotus's beatification in proof of honors paid him in the past.

The third chapter is devoted to the inspiring sources of the older picture at San Francesco and indirectly of Francia's also. These were two offices in honor of Mary Immaculate, the one written by Leonardo Nogarolo of Verona, secretary to Sixtus IV, and approved by this pope on the 27th of February, 1477; the other composed by the Ven. Fra Bernadino de Bustis and approved by the same pope October 4, 1480. (Mariale, Milan, 1493; Quaracchi, 1904.) Both these offices were sources of pictures of the Immaculate Conception, but Bernadino's was without doubt that of the older altarpiece. All the selections for the scrolls are found in both offices, except the words of Scotus; and the quotation from St. Augustine occurs in Bernadino's office only. In the Vesper Hymn of the latter office we read:

"Assueri regis sceptrum  
Caput tangens Virgo tuum  
Mori fecit laqueatum  
Aman sanctis inimicum."

which may actually have suggested the position of the two central figures, Christ and Mary. The painter of the altarpiece at San Francesco drew from Bernadino, and Francia under orders drew from the unknown painter. Though Bernadino does not quote the words of Scotus in his office, nevertheless he magnifies him saying that "he was destined by Our Lord Jesus Christ to defend the dignity of His mother." Of St. Anthony no mention is made in this office.

The present volume is the result of a labor of love, written in the author's well known, charming style, and the reader is able to



follow him step by step in his untiring and painstaking research. The illustrations are very good and almost enable the reader to form a judgment for himself. No one with artistic taste can peruse Mr. Carmichael's latest book without a keen sense of pleasure, and no library on art will be complete without it. Let us hope that the work on the Immaculate Conception in Art, to which this volume is to serve as an introduction, will soon appear from the same able pen.

FERDINAND HECKMANN, O. F. M.

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**Der Verfasser der Elihu-Reden.** Eine kritische Untersuchung von Dr. Wenzel Posselt. (Biblische Studien, xiv. Bd., 3. Heft.) Freiburg: Herder, 1909. 8vo., pp. 111. \$.85.

According to a number of biblical critics, the Elihu-speeches represent a later addition to the book of Job. Elihu is mentioned neither in the prologue nor in the epilogue of the poem. The transition from chapter 38 to chapter 39 is somewhat awkward and abrupt. Moreover, the section is marked by certain distinctive features of style, and contains a number of mannerisms, which are foreign to the rest of the work. These and other reasons have led many to the conclusion that the passage was subjoined by a later hand for the purpose of supplementing a few points of importance. Catholic writers, with the exception of Bickell, have uniformly declared in favor of the opinion that the speeches constituted a part of the book in its original form. Among non-Catholics Karl Budde may be cited as a defender of the same position. Dr. Posselt has re-examined the points that bear upon the authorship of Job 32-37. His investigation involves two classes of arguments: those concerned with the form and content, and those dealing with the style. The result of his inquiry may be summed up as follows: even though all the difficulties cannot be satisfactorily solved, the Elihu-speeches form an essential part of Job; the force of these difficulties is insufficient to prevent us from holding that the author of the rest of the book has also composed the disputed section.

While every reader will recognize the thoroughness and merit of this study, and the scholarship of its author, not every one will

subscribe to his conclusion. If the arguments pro and con are estimated at their face value, especially, if their cumulative strength is taken into consideration, they will be more apt to incline the mind in favor of a negative judgment. Dr. Posselt himself almost leaves this impression, thanks to his objective presentation of the difficulties against his theory. The possibility of later additions to the primitive text is not excluded by the divine character of the Sacred Scriptures provided that the increase of material proceeds from an inspired source. In fact, comparison of the Hebrew Bible with the Greek proves their existence. Furthermore, Dr. Posselt is not quite successful in showing that the Elihu-speeches contribute an essential element to the solution of the problem thrown up in the book of Job. The latter's afflictions raise the question about the sufferings of the just man, a point which is then discussed by the three friends. It is commonly assumed that the answer is conveyed in the words of God. If this is the case, the sayings of Elihu add nothing to the doctrinal integrity of the poem. But if they contain the proper solution it seems strange that they should not have received the approval of the Lord in His final judgment upon the controversy. The mediate position, that Elihu indicates in principle what is ultimately declared by God, has all the marks of an embarrassing makeshift.

A definite date cannot be assigned for the composition of Job. The beginning of the Babylonian captivity is fixed as the period supported by the greatest amount of probability.

A. MENGES, O. S. B.

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**A Life of Christ for Children, Illustrated.** New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1910. Pp. ix + 77. Price, \$1.00.

Parents and teachers who are responsible for the religious education of the young owe a debt of gratitude to the Catholic pen which has given us this beautiful volume. The work has a short preface by Cardinal Gibbons and bears the imprimatur of Archbishop Farley. The paper, the binding, and the illustrations are all of a high order of excellence. The pictures are all reproductions of the old masters. Only one who had lived close to the hearts of young children could have written the story.

It is the Gospel narrative simplified and interpreted to the child. As a supplementary reader it might be used with great profit in the third or fourth grade of any Catholic school. But in the hands of the teacher it will prove serviceable from the very first. The children will easily follow it when it is read to them and at a still earlier period they will enjoy it when it is told to them by the teacher, in some close approximation to the words of the text. Parts of the Gospel narrative lend themselves naturally to a simplified form suitable for the young, but even the most difficult parts, such as the story of the Passion, are here given with a simplicity and sweetness that has rarely been equalled. Many of the parables, such as those of the sower and the prodigal son, are rendered very effective and cannot fail to reach the child and mould his character. Every Catholic home should have this book and every teacher in the primary grades and every Sunday school teacher will find it invaluable. The artistic make-up of the book is such as to render it suitable for a gift book. If works of this class were in the hands of our children, a long step would be taken in the cultivation of a wholesome taste for good literature, for the work is in reality child literature of a high order.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

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**Leading Events in the History of the Church, Part I.** Written for schools by the Sisters of Notre Dame. London, R. and T. Washbourne; New York, Benziger Bros., 1909. Pp. viii + 124. Price, 40c. net.

This little manual is well illustrated. The paper is good, the print is clear. It is admirably adjusted to the capacity of the children and will prove serviceable in the Christian Doctrine class, for it is not a dry chronicle of facts, but a story of the early days of Christianity with a good deal of the warmth and glow that is needed to bring the events of this period home to the imagination and the heart of a child. Moreover, the facts are used to bring out the meaning of the truths of Christianity. The following passages will suffice to indicate the style of the work: After telling the story of the selection of the apostles and their training by the Master, the author continues: "He bade them preach the

faith to all nations, and gave them the power of working miracles to prove the truth of their teaching. He confided to them His own Divine authority, saying: 'As the Father hath sent me, I also send you.' All the apostles were consecrated bishops by Our Lord Himself, but that they might be united into one body, He chose St. Peter to be their head and chief when He, the Divine Founder of the Church, should have ascended into heaven. St. Peter was, therefore, the first Pope, shepherd and teacher of the one flock of Christ. To him Our Lord gave the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and to him He promised infallibility, which means 'that the Pope cannot err when, as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church.' But these powers were not to cease with the apostles. They were to consecrate and appoint other bishops and priests to whom they were to hand down all the teaching and authority entrusted to them by their Divine Master."

Or again, take this passage as simplifying one of the most difficult chapters of the catechism: "The society founded by Our Blessed Lord is the One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. One, because she has one Founder and Head, Jesus Christ, the Son of the one, true, living God, represented on earth by His vicar, the Pope, the successor of St. Peter. She teaches the one same faith, whole and entire, which Our Lord gave to His apostles. She administers the same sacraments He gave them the power to administer. Holy, because her Founder is God, the Holy One Himself; and because, if faithful to her teaching, men cannot fail to become saints. Catholic, because Our Lord said that His apostles were to teach all nations, that the Church would last through all time to the end of the world, and that the Holy Ghost would teach her all truth. Apostolic, because Our Lord taught His apostles the truths which they have handed down to us; and because He gave the apostles power to ordain other bishops and priests, and to hand on to them the orders and the mission they had received from Him. This continuity, or unbroken chain of apostolic succession, will go on in the Church till the end of time."

This little volume deals with the first five centuries of the Church. It ought to find a place in our schools. And if the subsequent parts of the work are as well written as this one, we have no doubt that it will meet a warm welcome, for our teachers have long felt the need of such a work.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.



**Handbook of Canon Law for Congregations of Women under Simple Vows.** By D. I. Lauslots, O.S.B. New York : Pustet, 1909. Pp. 280.

Despite the title under which this book appears, Father Lauslots has not written a handbook of canon law for congregations of women under simple vows, but has rather grouped together those special provisions of canon law which affect congregations of women under simple vows. In the preface we are told that "where the articles in the Handbook have not been taken either from the Constitution *Conditæ* or from the *Normæ*, they were selected from the works of learned canonists," but, further on, at the very close of the preface, we are informed that "this Handbook has been compiled, with the author's permission from the standard work of Dom Pierre Bastien, *Directoire Canonique à l'usage des Congrégations à voeux simples*. Perhaps these two statements are not mutually contradictory, but if they are, the latter is to be accepted as true. A close comparison of the two works makes it evident that there is nothing told the Sisters by Father Lauslots which has not already been said by Dom Bastien, and that the only originality which can be attributed to the English work is that of frequent abridgement and occasional consequent obscurity.

Paragraph 186 of the *Handbook* furnishes a good example of the dangers which beset Dom Bastien's disciple when he proceeds too far in the process of abridgment. This paragraph reads,—“For diocesan congregations, the Bishop has the right to dismiss religious, and dispense them from their temporary or perpetual vows.” The Constitution *Conditæ* is given as the authority for this statement, but if we consult that document we find that it very explicitly declares that the Bishop in such a case cannot, by his ordinary authority, dispense from the perpetual vow of chastity. Dom Bastien, in paragraph 199 of his *Directoire* says, “Dans les Congrégations diocésaines, L’Évêque peut dispenser des voeux perpétuels et temporaires,” but he adds, “excepté du vœu de chasteté perpétuelle.” He also explains that if the vow of perpetual chastity be conditional or if an indult be granted by the Holy See, the Bishop can dispense. This doctrine of the *Directoire* is correct, but in its abridged reproduction in the *Handbook* it is erroneous and misleading.

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**Religiosi Juris Capita Selecta**, by Raphael Molitor, O.S.B. Ratisbon, Pustet, 1909. Pp. viii + 560.

This substantial volume, from the pen of the Abbot of St. Joseph's monastery in Westphalia, is a scholarly and valuable addition to an important branch of canonical literature. It is not a general treatment of the law *de religiosis*, but, as the title indicates, a series of commentaries on selected important questions which do not often receive detailed attention. The nature of these questions is indicated in the headings of the eight chapters,—*De professione religiosa; De variis professionis religiosae generibus; De statu religioso; De verborum significatione; Qualis sit potestas regiminis; De variis religiosorum familiis; De abbatia regulari*. A complete list of papal constitutions bearing on the topics treated, an excellent bibliography and a good index help to make the work especially serviceable. It cannot be recommended too highly.

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**Blessed Mary of the Angels**, Discalced Carmelite, 1661-1717. A Biography. By the Rev. George O'Neill, S. J., M. A. With Portrait. Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1909. Price 75c. Pp. xii + 184.

This little work shows Father O'Neill in an entirely new light. He evidently found his subject congenial, and the result is a most charming essay in hagiology. Mary of the Angels, who died on December 16th, 1717, and was beatified on May 14th 1865, was one of those rare souls to whom extraordinary graces are vouchsafed. The miracles wrought during her life and after her death are set forth with such circumstantiality of detail and such cogency of testimony as to leave no room for doubt. Historians have been often puzzled to know how it was that Prince Eugene and Victor Amadeus—Macaulay's "faithless ruler of Savoy"—succeeded with a force greatly inferior in number in defeating the French troops under the Duc de la Feuillade on September 7th, 1706, and in so raising the siege of Turin. The true explanation is to be found by those who care to seek it in Father O'Neill's delightful volume.

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**Essays, Literary, Critical, and Historical.** By Thomas O'Hagan, M. A., Ph. D. Author's Edition. William Briggs, Toronto, 1909. Pp. 112.

These five essays are informing and pleasant reading. The first, *A Study of Tennyson's "Princess,"* is a generous and scholarly appreciation of a poem which is often grievously misunderstood. In *Poetry and History Teaching Falsehood* a warning note is opportunely sounded against the insidious poison often instilled, perhaps unintentionally, into the minds of the young by poets and historians. *The Study and Interpretation of Literature* exemplifies the new spirit which has come into being regarding the proper method of approaching the exposition of literary masterpieces. The emphasis laid on voice-culture as an aid in interpreting lyrics is one of the best features of a well-reasoned essay. *The Degradation of Scholarship* deals with educational conditions in the Province of Ontario, but it has a wider application. In this essay the writer takes the opportunity to pay a well deserved compliment to the historical works of Monsignor Shahan, Rector of the Catholic University of America. *The Italian Renaissance and the Popes of Avignon* corrects many current impressions that are grievously erroneous. Altogether, this is a book that will well repay study.

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**Phileas Fox, Attorney.** By Anna T. Sadlier. The Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1909. Price \$1.50. Pp. 349.

This is a wholesome tale, pleasantly, simply, and straightforwardly told. The plot, however, is slight, and in some particulars will not stand close inspection. The villain of the story is but crudely sketched and is far too shadowy. The love-making of Phileas and Isabel is unduly prolonged after Mrs. Vorst's death, for its ultimate outcome is certain, and the real interest oozes out with the disappearance of the repentant old lady from the scene. While allowance is made for these defects, it must also in justice be stated that the book is eminently readable. The pathetic incidents in particular are well constructed.

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**St. Vincent de Paul and the Vincentians** in Ireland, Scotland, and England, A. D., 1638-1909. By the Rev. Patrick Boyle, C. M. With Portrait of the Saint. R. and T. Washbourne, Ltd., London, Manchester, and Glasgow, 1909. Pp. 318.

Father Boyle divides his volume into three Books. The first gives an account of the establishment of the Congregation of the Mission by St. Vincent de Paul at Paris in the seventeenth century and of the Irishmen who were attracted to its ranks almost from the first. A vivid narrative is given of missionary labors carried on by the Vincentians in Ireland from the time of the Confederation of Kilkenny to the fall of Limerick in 1651. We also get a glimpse into some of the less known episodes of the campaign against Jansenism in France. Another chapter is devoted to the labors of the Vincentians in Scotland from 1651 to 1679 and in England from 1687 to 1688. A very interesting account is given of the establishment of the Irish Vincentians at Usher's Quay, Dublin, in 1833; of their foundation of St. Vincent's College, Castleknock, in 1835, and of their great church of St. Peter's at Phibsborough in 1838; and of their joining the Congregation of the Mission in 1839. Other chapters deal with the beginnings and work of the Sisters of Charity, of the Ladies' Association of Charity, and of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. Book II contains reprints of letters from Saint Vincent to some Irish priests of his Congregation. Book III gives brief but lucid sketches of ten of the most prominent Irish Vincentians of the nineteenth century. These miniature Lives are full of interest, as is indeed the entire volume.

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**Some Great Catholics of Church and State.** By Bernard W. Kelly. Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1909. Pp. 96.

Except to those who are already possessed of encyclopedic knowledge, the twenty Lives that make up this volume will afford valuable and interesting information. The range is great, running from Luiz Camoens in the sixteenth century to Lord Russell of Killowen at the end of the nineteenth, and including accounts of characters so diverse as Richard Crashaw; King John Sobieski;



Archbishop Fénelon; Bishop Hay; Frederick von Schlegel; Daniel O'Connell; Richard Lalor Shiel; John Lingard; Count de Montalembert; Daniel Rock; Alessandro Manzoni; Garcia Moreno; Orestes A. Brownson; Cardinal Newman; Ludwig Windthorst; Cardinal Manning; Marshal Mac Mahon; and Coventry Patmore. The narrative in each case is sympathetic, salient features and incidents being brought into special prominence. A most readable little volume.

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**Life of Mary Ward**, Foundress of the Institute of the B. V. M., compiled from various sources. With an Introduction by the Right Rev. Abbott Gasquet, O. S. B. Two Portraits. Burns and Oates, Limited, London; Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1909. Price 85c. net. Pp. xxv + 140.

A record of heroic virtue and of unfaltering perseverance and trust in God in the midst of overwhelming trials and tribulations. We are introduced to great scenes on the stage of the world's history such as the Thirty Years' War and the Civil War in England, but these do not distract our attention from the fate and fortunes of Mary Ward and her beloved Institute. As Abbott Gasquet points out in his carefully written introduction, the publication of this work is singularly opportune, for, after a lapse of 164 years, Pope Pius X., by Decree of April 20th, 1909, has permitted the nuns of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary to acknowledge Mary Ward as their foundress.

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**The Woman Who Never Did Wrong**, and Other Stories. By Katherine E. Conway. Thomas J. Flynn and Company, Boston. Price 75c. Pp. 140.

These nine short stories are delightful alike for their humor and their pathos, the pathos predominating. They are wholesome and withal full of human interest, and accordingly, while they are eminently suited *virginibus puerisque*, they are certain to appeal even to maturer minds.

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**Biographies of English Catholics in the Eighteenth Century.**

By the Rev. John Kirk, D.D. Being part of his projected continuation of Dodd's Church History. Edited by John Hungerford Pollen, S.J. and Edwin Burton, D.D., F.R. Hist. S. With five Portraits. Burns and Oates, London; Benziger Bros., New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1909. Price \$2.75. Pp. xvi + 293.

This is a compilation of immense research, a tribute to the patience, perseverance, and care of the late Dr. Kirk. The editors appear to have discharged their task admirably. The volume will be found to be of great value as a work of reference dealing with an obscure period.

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**Cyrus Hall McCormick; His Life and Work.** By Herbert N. Casson. Illustrated. A. C. McClurg and Co., Chicago, 1909. Pp. xii + 264.

This well-printed and profusely illustrated work may be fittingly described as the Romance of the Reaper. It is more than an account of the life and work of Cyrus Hall McCormick: it is a deft showing of one of the enterprises that helped to make the United States of America a great country, a clear study in an important phase of economics and sociology. And it is no dry-as-dust reading, either: it is instinct with a great human interest from cover to cover.

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**Some Papers of Lord Arundell of Wardour, 12th Baron, Count of the Holy Roman Empire, etc.** With a Preface by the Dowager Lady Arundell of Wardour. With Portrait. Longmans, Green, and Co., London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1909. Pp. xx + 292.

These papers deal intelligently with many of the questions that agitated British and Irish public opinion in the last half of the nineteenth century. Lord Arundell of Wardour was evidently a conscientious man, who took life seriously and thought deeply. He is, of course, not free from the prejudices of caste and class, but he always reasons temperately. His splendid Catholicism is everywhere apparent. Future historians will be glad to have such works as this to refer to when they desire to get the true inwardness of certain events of the Victorian era.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

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### Witnesses to Christ.

The following is, in part, the text of the Sermon preached in Divinity Chapel on the Feast of St. Paul, by Very Reverend John W. Cavanaugh, C. S. C., President of the University of Notre Dame:

And the witnesses laid down their garments at the feet of a young man whose name was Saul.—*Acts*, vii, 57.

*Rt. Rev. Monsignor, and Gentlemen of the University:*

He would be a brave man indeed who should venture in this venerable presence to speak of Theology, of Philosophy, of Scripture or the other Sacred Studies. You have great masters, many of whom are esteemed wherever learning is known. You have the best methods of study, whether of the modern or the ancient day. Especially—since all good teaching is really a sacramental action, a sort of communication of spirit—you have high example and incentive from the Faculty. Most of all you have the Great Finality of Truth. We Catholics have what the world in spite of its brave professions never can have: the divinely derived assurance that in the most important and sacred matters of human study we can not go wrong; that if—which God forbid!—the blinding vision should come to us of another kind from that which came to Saul; like Saul we have only to say: “Lord, what wouldst Thou have me to do?” in order to hear out of the heavens the unfailing Voice directing us to “go into the city and there it shall be told thee what to do.” Like Paul and Jerome and Augustine and Aquinas and the outstanding figures of all the Christian centuries, therefore, Catholics give more thought to the safeguards than to the restrictions set around them by their holy Faith.

These great advantages you have in virtue of your being here; what, then, may profitably be said to you on the feast of him who during all the Christian ages has been preëminently called “The Apostle.” For what did this University stand in the yearning vision of the founders? For what does it stand today in the hope of the Catholic clergy and laity of America?

Primarily for the highest learning and the most efficient use of it. All honor to the old Sulpician and diocesan Seminaries that gave us the venerable parish clergy of America. Tapestried with holy memories these old schools will always be tenderly cherished by generations of priestly sons as the *alma mater* of their souls! In founding this University the Fathers never dreamed that the product of it would be more dazzling examples of priestly faith and piety and chastity, more heroic exemplars of apostolic zeal and poverty and sacrifice. It would have been almost ungrateful, as well as futile, even to cherish the hope. Doubtless the parish priest has sometimes been over-zealous to edify the Church materially. Doubtless there was wisdom as well as genius in the words of that great Archbishop, your first Rector, whose name must have life and love within these walls forever and who, returning from the so-called Catholic countries, where cathedrals were magnificent and abundant and empty, found it in his heart to say: "I hope that the day will never come in America when these great cathedrals will stand as monuments in the graveyard of Religion." But remember that if the church-building priest and bishop have had their monumental enthusiasms they came by them honestly. They are the natural manifestations of an instinct developed in the hardy pioneer days. If the priest builds stately churches now, is it not because that same priest was forced by poverty to build modest chapels on the back streets of our cities a few years or decades ago? Is it not because in the matter of development fifty years of Europe have been better than a cycle of Cathay; and because our people have been called upon to supply in one or two generations such churches and schools and convents as other peoples created during the long Catholic centuries? Above all let it be forever remembered with gratitude that if the old pastor had his imperfections he had his fine exemptions, too; and one of the finest was a noble aloofness from the spirit of aristocracy, whether of blood or of books, which has stood as a wall of separation between priest and people in certain of the older countries.

There was, then, no cause for discontent with the spirit or the zeal of the old seminary priests. The aspiration of the American hierarchy was after a clergy whose preparation should not be hurried by the exigencies of growing dioceses; a clergy grown to its fullest stature in the leisure, the atmosphere and the opportunity here afforded; a militant clergy instinct not alone with the sense



of general battle but with the courage and the skill to wage single combat against the enemies of Revealed Truth. The bishops surely dreamed of a race of youthful Davids, who when the Goliaths of error stood forth to mock and deride the armies of the Lord, should send ringing through the world the holy challenge: Who is this uncircumcised Philistine that he should defy the armies of the living God? and then, waving aside the armor in which other men had fought—"not willing to wear any other man's clothes"—should stand forth in their own naked strength to hurl against the giant the little pebble that kills: the pebble of truth so feared of every hectoring Philistine before and since Goliath!

And what work awaits the Davids? St. Paul was the Apostle to the Gentiles: Shall there be no apostle to the genteels? I do not, of course, mean the superficial fops and dandies of the world; the social climbers and the lion tamers and the tedious parlor wits; but shall there be no part of the priestly family dedicated to the salvation of minds as well as of souls? or rather the salvation of minds as a means to the salvation of souls?

It is a lamentable fact that, so far at least as intellectual influence is concerned, the forces of error have today captured the imagination of the world. We who are within the Church have a loyal conviction that she is still the custodian of knowledge as well as of Faith. We know of our great Universities throughout the world and of our modest scholars who see deeply into the darkest questions of the schools and laboratories and cabinets. We write learned papers and deliver massive lectures to prove—what is undoubtedly true—that the Church has from the beginning been the friend of learning; that the fathers of every science have been her sons; that the arts have survived because they have been her handmaids; and indeed that the world has received hardly any immortal service except from her children. These things we know who are within the Church, but is it not true that the critic and the sceptic have succeeded in imposing their consciousness upon the world? Is not the old faith discredited in the minds of millions who do not, who can not, weigh and analyze and reject?

And here the preaching, baptizing, absolving parish priest may well retort upon the clerical savant. It is the beautiful charity the parish priest bestows upon the poor, the solicitude he shows for the children of his people, the fatherly love with which he enters

into their joys and sorrows that glorify the priesthood in the common eye. It is the work of the patient Sisterhoods and the multitudinous and ingenious ministrations of mercy devised by the Church that still hold for her the respect and admiration of the outer world. On its charitable and moral side the work of the priesthood had been brilliant; but has the scholar done his duty? Have we as a people achieved literary and scientific respectability here in America? Are we opposing a strong intellectual barrier to the advance of unbelief not only among our own people but throughout the nation? The Goliaths of error stalk proud and insolent before us; have we the Davids to send out against them?

Our hope lies in the University. A great American priest—it is fitting that I should mention the name of Hecker on the day when the great Community he founded is celebrating its Golden Jubilee—Father Hecker has said that if St. Paul lived in our day he would be a journalist; surely one of the prime functions of the university-bred priest is to cultivate and practice the art of composition; to take a large and honorable part in the discussion of important subjects and to show to the world that the tradition of priestly learning within the Church has not been lost. Of what avail will it be that we have a true message to deliver, if we are prophets of a harsh and stammering tongue? If we cannot speak to the age in the language of the age; if our argument is ponderous and pedantic; if our evangel is announced in strange accent or in foreign phrase.

Unquestionably, as I have said, the world today lies under the domination of the leaders of unbelief. In the judgment of the plain man modern research and criticism have sent confusion into the old Theology. He does not know the facts of the case but he has a vague conviction that the things which he held sacred in his youth are now discredited and denied. The newspaper, the magazine and the popular book are the vehicles that have brought this message to the multitude. The popular writer with the trick of turning a pretty sentence is the agent who spreads it. The world of simple folk and the middle folk naturally knows little of the man in the laboratory; but the popular writer acquaints himself with the findings of the laboratory and proceeds to make reputations, to destroy philosophies, to change beliefs, to abolish religions and regularly each year to re-create the face of the earth. The men who generate this atmosphere of unbelief are not masters

in research. They are of no importance compared with the scientist in the laboratory. In final consequence, they are of no importance compared with the simple millions who read and believe them; but because they assume to interpret the great scholar or scientist to the multitude they really wield an influence utterly disproportionate to their importance.

Now I appeal to you young men to take up this popular work. It is true that research is in large part the end and object of the University; it is true that you must have the specialist's knowledge in order to interpret the great scholar and the great scientist to the world. But what I plead for is a tribe of writers who shall take their stand in this middle field and by a brilliant presentation of the great questions of scholarship win back the world to a respect for the supernatural and for Revealed Religion.

To do this you must acquaint yourselves thoroughly with the contents of modern science; you must know the present status of those questions about which there is controversy, or if you take philosophy or scripture or sociology or economics for your field, you must be familiar with the farthest going questions in these great fields. But whatever the matter you select, what the Church expects of the University is a skilled body of intellectual swordsmen ready to leap to her defense at a moment's notice. It may be said that even if the skill and the will were present the pages of the great publications are to a large extent closed against the Catholic writer. In practical life, power will always find a way to function. If our work has charm or greatness the editors will contend with each other for its possession. At any rate there is the poverty of our own literature, the feebleness of our journalism and the yawning receptivity of even our best magazines.

The less prudent have a simple and common contempt for excellence in writing; but is there any finer test of the mentality of a man than his power of expression? Is there any quality that will so surely attract the indifferent and the unbelieving as distinction here?

Consider the enormous influence exercised on the more thoughtful class of popular readers by Mallock. He has made no serious contribution to philosophy, and yet his prismatic writings have colored thousands of minds on subjects of science and philosophy and theology. Read the life of Bernardine of Sienna and see how in that day of worldliness and scepticism he wrought his reforma-

tion through the gift of eloquence. Recall how in a later age when France lay under the lethargy of scepticism and indifference, there stepped one day into the pulpit of Notre Dame a brilliant young Dominican who had mastered in the schools the philosophy and science of his age and had learned the art of expressing thoughts that breathe in words that burn, and the next Sunday that great cathedral, but a little while before almost deserted, was thronged to the doors, while men and women waited for hours in the streets to see and hear Lacordaire. It is but a few years since there vanished out of the shadows into the Light the meek and lovable figure of Newman. When he entered the Church in the prime of his power he lay a long time under the odium of an apostate from the national church, but so great was his power of expression, so exquisite the quality of his diction, so limpid and fluid his utterance that he conquered distrust and dislike, conquered them to such a degree that when he passed away at a venerable age there went up a wail over the whole land, and men without distinction of creed lamented because they had lost the greatest leader of religious life in England. And—to speak out of our knowledge and our love—have we not seen almost within the shadow of this University how great a power is the art of expression in the life and achievement of one whose tongue of silver and heart of gold are among the brightest traditions of Washington, the lamented pastor who made the Church, her precepts and her practices beautiful in the eyes even of indifference and unbelief?

These are simple thoughts for a great day, but it is not unseemly that on the feast of St. Paul we should think of the immediate apostolic duties. They who stoned Stephen—that sweet figure in the earliest days—laid down their garments at the feet of a young Jew named Saul. Today we lay down our armor at the feet of Paul the Christian saint, at the feet of that titanic figure the splendor of whose mind was such that Festus, the Roman procurator, cried out in the midst of his court: “Saul, Saul, much learning hath made thee mad!” Paul whose genius was so mighty that Catholic Theology will bear its impress until the end of time. He was not content to preach to the faithful and the neophytes, but into the synagogues he went and into the temple and the Sanhedrim and the orthodox schools. He knew the philosophies of his day and the long-drawn oriental dreams, and he stood forth in the Areopagus and before the rulers in the courts of justice.



May he bless us from his seat near Christ this day and fill us with the missionary spirit.

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### The Origin of Religion.

The following is a brief résumé of the lecture delivered Thursday, February 3, by Very Reverend Doctor Charles F. Aiken, on the Origin of Religion :

For the solution of this problem, to which so many diverse answers have been given, anything like an absolute demonstration is out of the question. Positive, historic data derived from primitive times are wholly lacking. The best that can be offered is a theoretic solution, based on the world-view of peoples that in simplicity of material culture and of scientific knowledge approach nearest to the mental equipment of primitive man. This does not mean, as most evolutionists hold, that primitive man was a savage, and that in order to form an approximate idea of what his manner of life was, we should study the lower grades of savage life as we find them today. If savage life gives evidence of progress in some things, it shows unmistakable signs of degeneration in others. The humble plane of material culture on which primitive man began to live the life of a rational being, was one compatible with right moral and religious notions. Neither primitive morality nor primitive religion called for a mind trained to philosophy and science. The simplicity of social relations in the beginning made the range of ethical duties narrow and easy of comprehension, and even the religious conceptions of primitive man, in order to be true, did not need to be philosophically or scientifically profound. His view of nature must have been, to a large extent, similar to that held by people generally, who have not risen to a scientific conception of the physical laws of nature.

Now the history of religions shows that peoples not guided by the star of revelation have everywhere gone astray and, deifying the striking phenomena of nature, have come to worship many gods. No theory of the origin of religion can stand, which does not take into account this proneness of uncultured man to fall into polytheistic nature-worship, wherever ignorance of natural science has not been compensated by revealed teaching.

The notion of causality is one of the primary concepts of the

human mind. While the great run of men are not interested in the speculative search for the remote causes of things, they are keenly alive to the immediate causes of the striking things that take place in their world of daily experience. Now uncultured man has but a very limited knowledge of the forces of nature. What we call the mechanical, secondary causes of phenomena are but feebly grasped by him. The causes best known to him are living ones, himself, his fellows, the animals that move spontaneously in his sight. Wherever, then, he sees a phenomena showing movement and energy outside his limited experience of mechanical causation, he is led spontaneously to attribute it to some form of living agency. The thunder suggests as its immediate cause the thunderer. The sun and moon are taken to be living things, or their movement is explained by the presence of living agencies in or behind them. To attribute to these agencies intelligence and will, to fancy them personal beings, like himself, is an easy step, especially as there is in some of them a plain suggestion of order and purposive action. If it was thus the natural, almost inevitable tendency of early man to fancy distinct personalities working in and behind the various phenomena of nature, very little difficulty stood in the way of recognizing among these personal agencies one that was more or less supreme. Despite occasional instances of seeming lawlessness, strongly suggestive of malignant agents—as tornadoes, floods, earthquakes—the regular succession of day and night, the orderly movements of sun, moon, planets, stars, the unfailing recurrence of the seasons, all this could hardly fail to awaken in the mind of man a notion at least dim of a supreme Being, wisely directing the intelligent powers of nature to an orderly coöperation.

That this is not a difficult conception for the untrained mind is shown by the fact that in practically all forms of polytheistic nature-worship, an over-deity is recognized. Now according as these inferior intelligences were viewed as the creatures and dependents of the supreme being, or on the other hand were credited with a range of independent activity and with a corresponding right to divine honors, the primitive interpretation of nature would be monotheistic or polytheistic. This seems to be the line of thought that in the unscientific ages of the past has been the natural basis of religion. And as scientific culture began in a rudimentary stage, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the first

man had no other natural basis of thought for his religion. Though defective, it was a process of inference that might have led first man to a monotheistic conception of deity, but at the same time it carried with it no warrant of attaining to this happy result. From the proximate danger of going astray and of falling into polytheistic nature-worship, primitive man was safeguarded by divine revelation. Thus for the first man, no less than for his descendants to the end of time, revelation, apart from the supernatural life, may be pronounced morally necessary.

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### **The Temperance Movement.**

Synopsis of a lecture by Judge William H. De Lacy, at the Catholic University of America, Thursday, February 10, 1910, on "The Rise of the Temperance Movement." Judge De Lacy said in part:—

The Catholic Church stands for temperance. The Catholic University of America stands for temperance because temperance is the hope of the home, temperance is necessary for human happiness. And the Catholic Abstinence Union of America, early in the 90's, established at this University, the Father Matthew Chair as a centennial monument to that great apostle of temperance.

On Washington's birthday, 1870, at Baltimore, inspired with motives of patriotism and charity for their neighbor, representatives of Catholic Abstinence Societies from about a dozen States met and formed the Catholic Total Abstinence Union of America. Followers of Christ, they adopted a pledge to abstain from intoxicating drink and to discountenance the drinking customs of society, and offered their pledge in honor of the Sacred Thirst of our Saviour upon the cross.

This was the fruit of the seed planted as far back as 1849 when Father Theobald Matthew, the great Irish Apostle of Temperance, visited America. He was but an humble friar in charge of a mission chapel at Cork, but he had laid mankind under eternal obligation by herculean labors in the cause of temperance not only in his native land but abroad. More than a million persons had taken the pledge of total abstinence at his hands in Ireland and Great Britain alone. On his visit to this mighty republic, the

people gave him a reception eclipsing in grandeur the triumphs of the ancient Roman emperors. A great procession met him at the landing at Castle Garden, New York, and escorted him to the City Hall where he was welcomed by the Board of Aldermen, the Mayor and other dignitaries. Here in Washington, he was banqueted at the White House by President Taylor. The United States Senate voted him admission to its floor, an honor which General Lafayette alone had enjoyed up to this time. Henry Clay said of him, "It is but a merited tribute of respect to a man who has achieved a great social revolution—a revolution in which no blood has been shed, a revolution which has involved no desolation, which has caused no bitter tears of widows and orphans to flow; a revolution which has been achieved without violence, and a greater one, perhaps, than has ever been accomplished by any benefactor of mankind."

Such is the man whom the Union has honored, and in a monument to his memory they have properly furthered the great cause which is the grand object of their organization.

At the close of the eighteenth century the conviction had forced itself upon the American mind that the use of liquor was wrong. At the time nearly everybody used intoxicants. Stimulants were upon every sideboard. Indeed they were used as freely almost as water, for they were the regular table beverage in families and were invariably offered to visitors and guests. The doctor in his calls upon the sick and even the minister in rounds of parish duty imbibed the social glass of ardent spirits, and to refuse the proffered glass would have been regarded as discourtesy and an insult. Spirits were dispensed at christenings, at weddings and even funerals, at parties and fairs, and we find them even at the installation of ministers and clergymen. They entered closely into the hospitality of the period. They were regarded as so necessary that liquors were served as regularly as meals to the hands during harvest, to the mechanic and to the laborer, to the sailor before the mast and to the pleader before the bar.

With the change in public sentiment as to the utility and propriety of this indulgence in intoxicants the name and memory of Doctor Benjamin Rush, of Philadelphia, is forever connected. A member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, he rendered pioneer service also in the revolution against the use of spirits.



At first the movement was directed against the use of ardent spirits or distilled liquors, the greatest evil of the day. Then later it was recognized that the movement was not broad enough, and so efforts were likewise directed against fermented and malt liquors, as well.

The various movements started by philanthropists and churches finally culminated in February, 1826, in the formation at Boston of the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance. The unsatisfactory labor of the previous years had demonstrated to the friends of the cause that moderation in the use of intoxicants was not enough.

It became clear that the only effective remedy for intemperance is total abstinence or teetotalism. Henceforth, efforts of temperance men were directed not to the regulation of the use of strong drink but to its abolition. The effort now was to produce such a change of public sentiment and such a renovation of the habits of individuals and the customs of the community that, in the end, temperance, with all its attendant blessings, may universally prevail. To this end, the formation of volunteer temperance societies was promoted.

About this time, in the Scandinavian countries, the cause of temperance took its rise and one of the earliest societies was the Royal Swedish Patriotic Society at Stockholm. This culminated in the Gothenburg or company system, which was designed to arrest the physical, economical and moral ruin then threatening the nation in which the average per capita consumption of the brandy drinkers was 26.25 gallons annually. The company system undertook the entire public house and retail traffic in retail spirits and to conduct the traffic without private profit, the net proceeds to be devoted to some public purpose.

Then arose the great American Temperance Organization known as the Washington Temperance Society, founded in honor of the Father of his Country in Baltimore during 1840. Martha Washington societies among the women sprang into existence. These societies spread every where. To the Washington Society, at Springfield, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln delivered his famous Washington Birthday address in which he said: "If the relative grandeur of revolutions shall be estimated by the great amount of human misery they alleviate and the small amount they inflict, then, indeed, will this be the grandest the world shall ever have seen.

. . . . And when the victory shall be complete, when there shall be neither a slave nor a drunkard on earth, how proud the title of that land which may truly claim to be the birthplace and the cradle of both those revolutions that shall have ended in that victory!"

Judge De Lacy sketched the origin and history of the fraternal temperance orders, the recent spread of the prohibition movement throughout the south, and considered in detail the obstacles to further the triumph of the temperance cause, the greatest of which he considered the dependence of the National Government upon the Internal Revenue receipts from spirituous and malt liquors.

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### **Temperance and the Child.**

Judge William H. De Lacy lectured Thursday, February 17, at the Catholic University of America on "What Temperance Means for the Child." He said in part:—

Temperance means for the child right birth, God fearing parents, a home which is that "part of Heaven which man, without the portals, knows."

Intemperance ever meant destruction to the home. From the earliest times, from the days when Noah's drunkenness was the occasion of the division among his sons that brought Noah's curse upon his grandson Canaan, all down the ages, intemperance has been the fell destroyer of domestic happiness. Scripture tells us that "intemperate is wine and insolent is drunkenness." And again, "Who has woes, who has clamor, who has contentions, who has disgusting babblings, who has unavailing remorse?" From the days of the Fathers of the Church, Christian moralists have preached against intemperance. In the year 200, Clement of Alexandria in Egypt, preached a temperance sermon in which he said: "the natural, temperate and necessary beverage for the thirsty is water." This was the simple drink of sobriety which, flowing from the smitten rock, was supplied by the Lord to the ancient Hebrews.

He therefore admired those who had adopted an austere life and were fond of water, the medicine of temperance, and "fly as far as possible from wine, shunning it as they would the danger

of fire. It is proper, therefore, that boys and girls keep as much as possible away from this wine. For it is not right to pour into the burning season of life the hottest of all liquids—wine—adding, as it were, fire to fire.”

What must we say, then, when beer and other strong drink is given to babes? Information obtained from certain police forces in England as to the frequenting of public houses by women and children, presented to both Houses of Parliament by order of His Majesty, King Edward, in 1907, shows that “the practice among women of taking infants and young children into public houses at all hours, from early morning until late at night, is very general and very extensive. . . .

“Women give infants a portion of their beer to drink, they do this as it makes them, the children, sleepy and quiet. . . .

“Lessons which they learn at so tender an age are rarely, if ever, forgotten and, consequently, they cannot have the same chances in life as children brought up in a respectable home. . . .

“It more frequently occurs on licensed premises which are licensed also for public music, as the entertainment appears to have an attraction for women.”

And, alas, we know of the habit of “rushing the growler” in the cities throughout our land. Intoxicants thus brought into the home are frequently shared with the children, and yet physicians state that alcohol gives no strength, reduces the tone of the blood-vessels and heart, reduces nervous power, builds up no tissues and can be of no use to man or any other animal as a substitute for food. Even in the treatment of disease, it is testified that the use of all forms of alcoholic drinks may be abandoned not only with safety but with positive benefit to the patient. Alcohol destroys the individual, alcohol destroys the individual’s home—the home the true unit of our national life, and we know that as the homes are so will the nation be. Drunkenness invades the sanctity of the home, breaks the hearts of wives and mothers, terrorizes the children, turns the happy period of childhood into the blackest gloom.

When the saloon keeper needs an employee he advertises for a sober man. And yet the frequenter of the saloon who is a trusted servant may by his drunkenness ruin a whole industry, deprive many men of work and plunge hundreds of families into poverty. Drunkenness makes of workers idlers, drones, vagrants and vagabonds, for it is not unusual for the hard drinker to become impressed with the belief that he cannot work.

The father of a family, reduced to this level, is unfit to discharge his parental obligation to feed, clothe, shelter, and educate his children. Want drives helpless children into the street to beg, mayhap to steal. The destruction of their homes deprives children of their opportunity for schooling, sends them, with character unformed, into the bustle and temptation of life, there to have their little bodies bent and twisted and stunted with premature toil, their little hearts saddened and hardened to cruelty and sin, their capabilities frozen and blackened in the bud. And it not unfrequently happens that the drunkenness of the parent is communicated to the child. A boy of eleven was prompted by his appetite for drink to break into a saloon and steal bottles of whiskey upon which he became intoxicated. Treatment in an institution for over a year worked no change in the boy's propensity for drink, and after three years he is still a habitual drunkard. He has lately been committed to an institution. It is not unusual for the daughter of the drunkard to become a victim of the horrors of white slavery. Whichever way we turn, the heart sickens at the want, misery, crime and degradation caused by drink. And there will be no efficient remedy until the national government ceases to depend upon the internal revenue on spirits, beer and wine which now furnish more than twenty-five per cent. of the nation's income. This revenue is most successfully and efficiently collected. This governmental ability should be converted into an engine for the suppression of drink. Think of it! The wisest, the best government on earth, in league with the powers of darkness that destroy in drunkenness thousands of its citizens, the bodies, minds and souls of men, women and children. It is monstrous that a government formed to establish justice, to promote prosperity and to provide for the general welfare should be thus linked with such foul contagion. Let us cast about for other and more honorable sources of income to sustain our national burdens.

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## UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

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**Gift to the Library.** Through the generosity of E. Francis Riggs, Esq., of Washington, a member of its Finance Committee, the University has received a copy of the famous *Paléographie Musicale*, edited by the Benedictines of Solesmes in France. This superb work, so far in ten large quarto volumes, is destined to contain many of the great plain chant manuscripts of the Middle Ages, those especially which were in public liturgical use in the great cathedrals and monasteries of Catholic Europe, and therefore best represent the temper of the Church in all that pertains to her own music. The original manuscripts are here reproduced phototypically, in the most scientific manner, among them the ninth or tenth century Antiphonal of St. Gregory that represents the traditions of Metz and Saint-Gall; the Responsory-Gradual "Justus ut Palma" compiled from various ninth to seventeenth century manuscripts, and representing the richest collection of musical manuscripts yet published (Italian, Lombardian, Aquitanian, Messinese, English, French); the Einsiedeln Antiphonal of the tenth to eleventh centuries; the Ambrosian Antiphonary (Codex Add. 34209 of the British Museum) probably the most ancient of all those which preserve the tradition of the Milanese plain-song, and through which it first became possible to distinguish accurately between the Gregorian and Ambrosian melodies otherwise so full of resemblances; the Montpellier Antiphonary of the eleventh century, with its valuable double notation above the text, *i. e.*, alphabetical notation and neum accents; the Antiphonal of Blessed Hartker (St. Gall, tenth century) a very complete monastic antiphonary, with over 2200 anthems and more than 800 responses, whose Saint Gall neumatic notation is very beautiful and clear, and is accompanied by Romanian letters and signs. For the history of medieval music, in itself no small province of mental cul-

ture, these phototyped manuscripts are invaluable. It is certain that in the future many students and readers in the University Library will bless the generous and scholarly donor for his thoughtful gift. Mr. Riggs presented a year ago to the University the very rich B. Stade Library, an important collection of works on the Old Testament, gathered over long years by one of the principal professors of the Old Testament in Germany.

**The University Collection** for 1909 has proven so far considerably in advance of last year's, a very gratifying fact, as it gives tangible evidence of the interest taken by the Catholic people and their clergy in our great central educational institution. The amount given freely by each individual is so small that no one need feel it as a burden, while the good accomplished by this slight mutual effort is beyond calculation, for the Church is thereby enabled to keep up with dignity a central institution of learning, equally useful to the different dioceses, since its scholarship, its libraries, prestige and various academic advantages, are meant for all, and eventually benefit all. This collection, moreover, keeps annually before the whole people the existence, nature, and purpose of the Catholic University, as the great foundation of Leo XIII and the American Hierarchy, where genuine learning and true religion must always find an equally warm welcome and be suitably cherished and advanced.

**Lecture on Washington.** Hon. Bellamy Storer of Boston, formerly Ambassador to Vienna, delivered an admirable discourse on "Washington the Christian" at the University, February 22. A very large and distinguished audience was present, and after the lecture many remained to greet the scholarly speaker, who is always well remembered in Washington as a former Congressman from Ohio, and diplomatic representative of the United States successively at Brussels, Madrid, and Vienna. Among those present at the lecture was Mrs. Maria Longworth Storer, the wife of Mr. Storer and a

benefactress of the University to which she lately gave the sum of ten thousand dollars.

**Feast of St. Thomas.** The Feast of St. Thomas of Aquin, patron of the Faculty of Philosophy, was celebrated March 7 in Divinity Chapel, Caldwell Hall. The celebrant of the Mass was Very Reverend J. Grimal, S. M., President of the Marist College, and the preacher was Reverend Thomas V. Moore, C. S. P., Ph. D.

**Dr. Kerby as Arbitrator.** The Reverend William J. Kerby, Ph. D., Professor of Sociology, was appointed arbitrator in two important cases. The one is the controversy between the Big Four Railroad and the Order of Railway Telegraphers involving wages and conditions of employment; the other, involving the same questions is between the B. & O. Southwestern and the Order of Railway Telegraphers.

**Public Lectures in Boston.** Under the patronage of a number of prominent Catholic ladies in Boston a course of lectures on the Psychology of Education was delivered during Lent at the Hotel Tuileries in that city. On Tuesday, February 15 and Tuesday, February 22, Reverend Doctor Thomas E. Shields lectured on "The Backward Pupil" and "The Culture-Epoch Theory." On Tuesday, March 1 and Tuesday, March 8, Very Reverend Doctor Edward A. Pace lectured on "Culture and Training" and "The Discrimination of Ideals." The Committee in charge of the arrangements for the course included Mrs. Bellamy Storer, Mrs. Charles Bruen Perkins and Mrs. John Papst Blake.

**Lecture Course in New York.** The University was well represented in the course of Lectures for men given at the Cathedral College in New York under the auspices of the Institute for Scientific Study. His Grace, the Archbishop of New York, presided at the first meeting, February 16, at which Reverend Doctor Kerby lectured on "Private Property and



Socialism." The lecture on "Organized Labor," which was to have been given by Doctor Charles P. Neill, formerly of this University, was delivered by Doctor Kerby. On March 2 Reverend Doctor Patrick J. Healy lectured on "Christian Brotherhood." Two of the alumni of the University, Reverend Francis P. Duffy, D. D., and Reverend John J. Burke, C. S. P., also took part in the course. The former lectured on "The Social Value of Christianity" and the latter on "Publicity as an agent in Social Reform." The General Director of the course was another distinguished alumnus of this University, Reverend William Martin, S. T. L.

**Department of Law.** At the solicitation of Captain Joseph E. Willard, sometime Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia and now chairman of the State Corporation Commission, and Doctor James Buchanan, President of the Juvenile Protective Association, Judge William H. DeLacy, Associate Professor of Common Law, went to Richmond, Virginia, and addressed, on Thursday evening, January twenty-seventh, in the House of Delegates, the members of the Virginia Legislature, and of the Juvenile Protective Association, upon the function and usefulness of the Juvenile Court.

Three bills have been prepared for submission to the Virginia Legislature, as follows:—

A bill making it a misdemeanor for parents or guardians to refuse or neglect to support their children or to encourage the wrong-doing of the child;

A bill forbidding the commitment of minors, under eighteen years of age, to jails and penitentiaries, and to provide for their detention, under the supervision of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, in suitable homes and institutions; and

A bill to amend and reënact the Act approved March twelfth, 1904, entitled "An Act making it a misdemeanor to desert without just cause or wilfully neglect to contribute to the support and maintenance of his wife or minor children in destitute or necessitous circumstances."

In support of these measures, it was deemed expedient to have Judge DeLacy visit Richmond and give the results of his experi-



ence in the enforcement of similar laws in the District of Columbia.

During his remarks, the Judge sketched the different classes of jurisdiction conferred on the Juvenile Court at Washington, touching upon the folly of committing children charged with crime to the same institutions that housed adult criminals, and made an earnest plea for the separation of the child from the adult criminal both at the trial and in the subsequent commitment to institutions when found necessary.

The Judge laid stress upon the fact that the child, "the citizen of tomorrow," is the most valuable asset in the State, his conservation vastly transcending in importance the preservation of our material resources. He argued that it was cheaper to save the child than to punish criminals.

At the same time, the fact was emphasized that the family, and not the child, is the real unit in the State, and that the correction of the wayward child often involves the rehabilitation of the unfit home out of which he comes.

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